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Abstract
THREE ESSAYS ONFISCAL POLICY
by
SINEM BUBER SINGH
Adviser: Professor Merih Uctum
This dissertation examines the domestic and internationaleffects of fiscal policy shocks on
country risk, stock markets returns and trading partners. There are three essays in this study.
First essay examines the relative impacts of macroeconomic, financial and political variables
on country risk for five advanced economies; the US, the UK, Canad and Singapore for 1984:M1-
2014:M12 and Germany for 1990:M9-2014:M12 time periods. Todo so, I follow a two stage
estimation procedure. In the first stage, a CAPM is used to estimate time-variant country betas
which are used as a proxy for country risk by using a DCC-GARCH model. Then, at the second
stage, time variant country betas are regressed on a set of macroeconomic, financial and political
variables to distinguish the relative effects of each variable on country risk. Finally, a Kalman Filter
approach is used to re-estimate time-variant country betasas a robustness check. The empirical
findings of this study show that even though the significance ad the direction of the impacts of risk
factors differ from one country to another, among macroeconomic variables, budget surplus and
current account surplus have significant effects on most country betas, whereas, generally, political
risk does not have a significant effect on country risk in advanced economies.
In the second essay, I characterize the effects of fiscal policy shocks on aggregate and sectoral
stock market returns in the US for 1975-2013 period with a Structural Vector AutoRegressive
(SVAR) Model. The results of this study show that in case of an expansionary (tight) fiscal policy,
aggregate stock market returns decrease (increase). Unexpect dly, neither sectoral stock returns
respond to policy shocks in the same direction, nor is there an observed co-movement between the
iv
reactions of stock returns of different sectors. As energy and utility sector returns move in the same
direction with aggregate returns, financial sector returnsmove in the opposite direction. Moreover,
both positive government spending and positive governmentrevenue shocks decrease industrial
sector returns whereas increase healthcare sector returns.
Finally, the third essay characterizes the results of US government spending shocks on domestic
and foreign economies. To do so, I analyze the dynamic effects of a positive US government
spending shock on real output and real household consumption of Canada and the US, as well
as, the real exchange rate from 1957 to 2013 by employing a SVAR model. The findings of
the study state empirical evidence in favor of a positive intr ational transmission of domestic
fiscal expansion. A positive US government spending shock inreases not only US output and
consumption but also Canadian output, as the real exchange rate appreciates.
v
Acknowledgments
Firstly, I would like to thank my advisor Prof. Uctum for her continuous support of my Ph.D.
study. Not only did she provide the dataset, insights and valuable feedback for my research, but
also her guidance that led me to explore my limits at every challenge and opportunity presented
throughout this journey. This dissertation would not be possible without her invaluable support
and inputs.
Besides my advisor, I would like to thank the rest of my dissertation committee: Prof. Wang,
and Prof. Giannikos, for their insightful comments and encouragement, but also for hard questions
which incented me to widen my perspective.
I would like to thank Prof. Vijverberg for his feedback and time on my first research paper
which I wrote as a part of the research and writing course thoug t by him.
I thank to my friends for walking this path with me; especially to Sibel Korkmaz for being a
great teacher, Osman Dogan for helping me to construct my first research idea, and Ilhami Gunduz
for listening to my complaints all the time. Also, I would like to thank Ahu Yildirmaz for pushing
me to the finish line.
I would like to thank my family: my mother for everything she has sacrificed to raise me the
vi
person I am today and to my brother and sisters for believing in me even when I did not believe in
myself.
Last but not least, I would like to thank my husband for his immense support every single day
since I met him. I would not be writing these sentences without him. He drove me to the library
every day so that I can study for my examinations; he kept me motivated and did not let me get
discouraged even in the worst days of my study. I cannot thankim enough for believing in me








List of Tables xi
List of Figures xii
1 Relative Effects of Macroeconomic Variables to Country Risk 1
1.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Selected Literature Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 Model and Methodology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4.1 Estimation of Country Betas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4.2 Effects of Macroeconomic Variables on Country Risk. . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4.3 Estimation Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.5 Robustness Check. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.5.1 An Alternative Estimation Method: Kalman Filter Approach . . . . . . . . 24
1.5.2 Relative Effects of Macroeconomic Variables on CountryRisk . . . . . . . 25
1.5.3 Estimation Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Appendix: DCC-GARCH Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
ix
2 The Effects of Fiscal Policy on Stock Market Returns: A Sectoral View 46
2.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.2 Selected Literature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.3 Data and the Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.3.1 The Empirical Model and Methodology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.3.2 Data Description. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.4 Results and Robustness Check. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.4.1 Results for Aggregate Stock Returns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.4.2 Results for Sectoral Returns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.4.3 Robustness Check. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Appendix: Global Industry Classification Standard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3 International Effects of US Government Spending Shocks: TheCase of Canada 69
3.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.2 Selected Empirical Literature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.3 Empirical Evidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.3.1 Data Description. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.3.2 The Model and Methodology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.3.3 Empirical Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.3.4 Robustness Check. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83




1.1 ICRG Data Description. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.2 Point System for Risk Level of Budget Balance as a Percentageof GDP . . . . . . 35
1.3 Descriptive Statistics of DCC GARCH Country Betas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.4 Unit Root Test Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.5 Model Selection for DCC GARCH Country Beta Models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.6 Residuals and Stability Test Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.7 DCC GARCH Beta Models-Estimation Outputs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.8 Long Run Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.9 Descriptive Statistics of Country Betas-Kalman Filter Estimation . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.10 Model Selection for Kalman Beta Models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.11 Residuals and Stability Test Results-Kalman Beta Models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1.12 Results for Kalman Beta Models-Estimation Outputs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.1 Definition of Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.2 Unit Root Test Results for Variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.3 Granger Causality Test Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
xi
List of Figures
1.1 Stock Market Returns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.2 Time-Variant Country Betas-DCC GARCH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.3 Comparison of Time-Variant Betas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.1 IRF-1975-2013 Period. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.2 Impulse Response Functions for 1975-2013 Period. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.3 Impulse Response Functions for 1990-2013 Period. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.4 Impulse Response Functions for 1990-2013 Period. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.5 IRF for Sectoral Returns without Debt Feedback. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.6 Impulse Response Functions for Sectoral Returns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.7 IRF-1975-2013 Period without Debt Feedback. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.8 IRF-1975-2013 Period without Debt Feedback. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.9 IRF-Sectoral Returns without Debt Feedback. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.10 IRF-Sectoral Returns without Debt Feedback. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.1 IRF to a One Unit US Government Spending Shock. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.2 IRF 1972-2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.3 IRF-Alternative VAR Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.4 Response of Canadian Government Spending to US GovernmentSp ding Shock. 92
3.5 IRF to a One Unit Government Spending Shock. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
xii
Chapter 1
Relative Effects of Macroeconomic
Variables to Country Risk
1.1 Introduction
The business world is reshaping as a response to erratic dynamics of an increasingly intercon-
nected world. Many lessons are learned by both business world and public authorities from the
recent global imbalances such as the 2008 Great Recession, the Arab Spring, political instability
in Ukraine, and Greek debt crisis at the heart of the Eurozonecrisis. These global waves reminded
the business world that counterparty risk is not the only peril when it comes to minimize the risk
exposure, in deed, the country risk which is all systematic risks but the counterparty risk, plays an
as important role in a possible default. As we define the country risk as an aggregation of financial,
political, and economic risks at both local and global levels, the recent global dynamics underline
the importance for the integral structure of it, since not only the Great Recession and Eurozone
emphasized the crucial roles of financial, economic and sovereign risk, but also the Arab Spring
and Ukraine crisis give a non-negligible weight to political stability.
In existence of inter-correlated global uncertainties, quantifying the country risk is not only
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a challenge that is increasingly critical to those who are a part of the global business world, but
also gaining gradual attention from researchers in the science of economics. Existing methods to
measure the country risk include, but not limited to, structured qualitative methods such as coun-
try investment ratings assigned by rating agencies, country risk reports published by independent
investment consulting firms and quantitative methods basedon various statistical models.
As widely used country risk measurements in the business world, the country risk reports and
ratings have limitations of being opaque, subjective and unreliable. This critique is supported by
the empirical findings of Oetzel et al. (2001). They examine eleven most commonly used country
risk measures including those published by Euromoney Magazine, Institutional Investor Magazine
and Political Risk Services, across seventeen countries fornineteen years by using a logistic model.
They use currency fluctuations to test for the reliability and predictive power of those risk measures
and find that commercial risk measures perform poorly at predicting actual risk realizations.
Although the model has the limitation of using only currencyfluctuations; not a comprehensive
enough proxy for country risk, the study empirically confirms the overall reaction of the investors
in global financial markets towards the accuracy of rating agencies given that they granted the
mortgage-backed securities with high investment grades during 2008 crisis.
Among quantitative models, limited dependent variable models are commonly used by country
risk researchers (Oetzel et al. (2001), Cooper (1999), Lanoie and Lemarbre (1996) and, Muwando
and Gumbo (2013)). Apart from the traditional econometric models, artificial and hybrid neural
network models as well as discriminant analysis found placein the empirical literature to measure
the country risk. Yim and Mitchell (2005) state that among neural network, logit models, cluster
techniques and discriminant analysis, hybrid neural network models outperform all and may be a
useful tool for markets as well as researchers who are interested in early warning systems.
In this paper, I use a Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to estima e country betas as a
measure of country risk for five advanced economies; the US, the UK, Canada, Germany and Sin-
gapore. Since stock market returns are responsive to both glbal and local dynamics, this approach
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has the advantage of being able to capture the effects of all risk components that one cannot fully
incorporate in a model. Moreover, a Capital Asset Pricing Model is intuitive, transparent and rel-
atively new to country risk applications although it has unrealistic assumptions such as market
efficiency. After estimating country betas, this study dives deeper into the country risk analysis
and tries to distinguish the relative effects of macroeconomic, financial and political risk variables
on country beta for the US, the UK, Canada and Singapore for 1984-2014, and Germany for 1990-
2014 time periods.
Although there are a fair number of empirical studies employing country beta approach to
quantify the country risk, they have a common limitation of cmparing country betas for countries
of different financial integration level. Comparison of country betas among countries with varying
financial integration levels might be quite misleading sinceQt , an indicator of financial integration,
is pretty low for developing countries although those countries have more volatile financial markets
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common limitation of some studies in the country beta literature since they pool a set of countries
with various levels of financial integration (Arfaoui and Abaoub (2010)). The countries in this
study are chosen of similar financial integration levels to address this limitation.
In addition, the second stage; examining the relative impacts of economic and financial indi-
cators while controlling for political risk, is quite important and timely since the stress testing and
capital planning regulations that the Federal Reserve started to impose on financial institutions af-
ter the Great Recession, once again, underline the role of macroeconomic balances in systematic
risk composition.
The empirical findings of the study show that, even though thesignificance and the direction
of the impacts of risk factors differ from one country to another, among macroeconomic variables,
budget surplus and current account surplus have significanteffects on most country betas whereas,
generally, political risk does not have a significant effecton country risk in advanced economies.
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This paper has six sections. Section 2 summarizes the selected mpirical literature, section 3
describes the data, section 4 states the empirical findings of the study, section 5 checks for the
robustness and section 6 concludes.
1.2 Selected Literature Review
As the components of country risk; political and economic risk attracted more interest in theoret-
ical studies of punctuated equilibrium theory and entrepreneurship theory (Di Gregorio(2005)) in
strategic management literature than the field of economics, economics literature gives gradually
increasing attention to empirical studies. One of the rare theoretical papers on country risk; Eaton
et al. (1986), create a two-period theoretical model in which they distinguish the international
lending markets from domestic credit markets due to enforcement problems and the absence of
collateral. The model focuses on the potential inefficiencis in international lending such as the
magnitude of outstanding lending which increases the likelihood of a default and informational
externalities which may contribute to the occurrence of runs leading to a lending crisis. They sug-
gest that the former can be solved by banking regulations that are imposed not only on the ratio
of loans to a single borrower but all loans to a single country, and the latter can be solved by a
lender-initiated moratorium. They add that another regulation that policy makers should adopt is
on the full disclosure requirements of loans made to individual countries.
Another theoretical study on country risk, Damodaran (2003), questions if the country risk
can be diversified and finds that given the increasing correlation across equity markets in many
countries, country risk cannot be diversified away. Moreover, h tries to calculate a country risk
premium by taking into account the default spread on a governm nt bond issued by a particular
country and the relative volatility of the country’s equitymarkets to the US equity market. Then, he
argues that a company-specific country risk premium should be incorporated in the cost valuations
of multinational companies depending on the risk exposure.
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Despite the limited scope of theoretical models on country risk, the empirical literature on the
topic is quite rich in terms of the variety of approaches adopted to quantify country risk as well
as its relationship with various macroeconomic variables.Erb et al. (1996a) is one of the first
and leading papers in empirical literature utilizing Sharpe’s CAPM in country risk calculation.
They use Institutional Investor’s country credit ratings and develop measures of payback and cal-
culate the recovery time of an investment by combining the expected hurdle rate with the expected
volatility. They criticize the existing International CAPMapplication of country risk measurement
since they argue that one cannot measure the idiosyncratic systematic risk the same way for both
developed and emerging markets. They use country beta approach only for developed economies,
and volatility of national stock markets, which explain thecross-sectional variations in expected
returns better, for emerging markets.
The empirical studies examining the relationship between macroeconomic dynamics and the
risk of a country by using a country beta approach follow two different estimation procedures.
The early papers on the topic follow a one-step estimation prcedure in which the macroeconomic
variables are substituted into CAPM framework to replace country beta, instead of estimating
country beta singularly and then regressing on macroeconomic variables. Gangemi et al. (2000) is
one of the papers which follow a one-step estimation procedure to understand the macroeconomic
triggers of Australian country beta over the period 1974 to 1994. Their results show that Australia’s
exchange rate is the only macroeconomic factor that significa tly affects Australian country risk.
Andrade and Teles (2004), another paper that follows a one-step estimation procedure find that
monetary policy and international reserves have a significat influence on Brazilian country beta
whereas Verma and Soydemir (2006) find that global factors such as real interest and inflation rates
of G7 countries have stronger influence on country risk levelof Latin American countries includ-
ing Brazil, than local factors such as monetary policy. The importance of global factors are also
mentioned in Glova and Pastor (2013) that use a least square app oach to explain the interaction of
economic variables and country risk for Visegrad countries; Czech Republic, Romania, Poland and
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Hungary, for 2006-2013 time period and state that global factors have greater influence on their
betas.
Although a one-step estimation technique, which estimatesCAPM parameters after substitut-
ing country beta with all macroeconomic variables, models adynamic country risk, it does not
estimate the coefficients of macroeconomic variables singularly to better capture the magnitude of
their impact on country risk, but rather estimates the coeffici nts of the interaction terms between
country beta and macroeconomic variables.
A common limitation of the studies that examine the interaction of macroeconomic variables
with country risk is to control for political risk factors. Given that country risk is affected from
not only financial and economic structure of a country but also it political stability, omission of
political risk factors might lead to biased estimates of therelative effects of economic variables.
Therefore, in this study I control for political and financial risk factors while focusing on the
influence of macroeconomic variables.
Among the papers that follow a two-step estimation procedurand calculate country beta ex-
plicitly, Basu et al. (2011) state that Indian country risk ishighly correlated with FDI flows, interest
rates, exchange rates and unemployment rate. Arfaqui and Abaoub (2010) use a GARCH model to
estimate country betas and then employ a panel model to explain the impacts of macroeconomic
and financial variables on country betas for 15 countries. They underline the increasing impor-
tance of global risk factors and the interferences between idiosyncratic and common factors. The
drawback of their study is to put together 15 international stock markets of both developed and
emerging markets which are of different global financial integration levels that directly affect the
magnitude of country betas used to quantify country risk.
Although there is no agreement in the empirical literature on the optimal methodology to quan-
tify country risk, there is a consensus on the dynamic structu e of it. There are various estimation
techniques employed to capture the dynamic structure of country betas. Employing a GARCH
model is quite common since GARCH family models are to estimatetim -variant volatility of
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both global and national stock market returns, not all dynamic odels are able to capture time-
variant structure of correlation coefficients which measure the level of global financial integration
of a country, yet it is a crucial attribute of a dynamic country beta.
Among GARCH family models, I employ a Dynamic Conditional Correlation Generalized Au-
toRegressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (DCC-GARCH) modelsince not only the volatility of
a country’s stock market has a time dependent order but also does its financial integration level.
Yang et al. (2012) estimate country betas for BRICS from 1995 to 2010 by using a DCC-GARCH
model and their results show that the dynamic correlation coefficient of BRICS with global stock
returns have an increasing trend, especially after 2008 crisis, implying a higher level of financial in-
tegration of BRICS. Marshall et al. (2009) compare DCC-GARCH, Kalman filter, Schwert Seguin
and GARCH (1, 1) models in country beta estimation of emerging markets from 1995 to 2008 and
conclude that, according to Diebold-Mariano test statistics, Kalman filter approach outperforms
the rest. Therefore, I employ a Kalman filter approach to testthe robustness of the results of this
study.
I believe this paper contributes to the existing empirical literature on country beta approach to
examine the effects of macroeconomic variables on country risk by employing a DCC-GARCH
model to better capture the dynamics of global financial markets, using a comprehensive dataset
on country risk components and, controlling for political and financial risk.
1.3 Data
To measure the effects of macroeconomic variables on country risk for five developed economies;
the US, Canada, the UK, Germany and Singapore, I follow a two stage estimation procedure. First,
I use Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to estimate country betas which are used as a proxy
for country risk and then the estimated country betas are regressed on a set of political, financial
and economic variables to distinguish the relative effectsof each risk component on country risk
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overall.
At the first stage, estimated country betas measure the sensitivity of a country’s asset market
index compared to overall global asset market index. I used natio al as well as global monthly
stock market indices from 1984:M1 to 2014:M12 aggregated byMorgan Stanley Capital Interna-
tional (MSCI) database. The MSCI world index is an aggregated index of 23 developed markets
which include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong
Kong, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US1.
At the second stage of the estimation, I regress country betas on a set of economic, financial
and political risk components. At this stage, I use monthly ICRG country risk data2 from 1984:M1
to 2014:M12. ICRG country risk data is based on a statistical model created in 1980 to forecast
financial, economic, and political risk for all countries bythe editors of International Reports, a
widely respected weekly newsletter on international finance and economics. The ICRG country
risk data details a comprehensive system that enables various types of risk to be measured and
compared between countries. The advantages of this data arehat, unlike most of macroeconomic
series, ICRG country risk data is monthly and has detailed riskcomponents to measure political
risk which are not captured by macroeconomic indicators andcan create an omitted variable bias
in a model in which political risk components are not distinguished. Table1.1 shows a detailed
description of each component and its point scale for corresponding risk levels. Depending on the
riskiness of the component, a point is assigned in a scale of zr to 5, 6, 10, 12 or 15, given the
weight of a component in overall composite risk index, in which a low point represents a high risk
and a high point represents a low risk level.
This dataset is also used by Erb et al. (1996b). They questionthe economic content of five
1More information about MSCI indices and their methodology can be found at https :
//www.msci.com/resources/factsheets/index fact sheet/msci− world− index.pdf
2More details about ICRG methodology can be found atht ps : //www.prsgroup.com/wp −
content/uploads/2014/08/icrgmethodology.pdf
8
different country risk measures; ICRG’s political, financial, economic and composite risk indices
along with Institutional Investor’s country risk ratings if any contain information about future ex-
pected stock returns and the results show that they are correlated with future equity returns and
highly correlated with equity valuation measures. Together with the availability and monthly fre-
quency of the data, its correlation with equity returns is the reason ICRG data is used in this study.
There are also limitations of ICRG data, since it is a discrete data. It quantifies the risk for
a given range therefore, a minimal change in a variable does nt affect the point assigned for the
risk level. For example; Table1.6 shows the point system for budget balance as a percentage of
GDP. 9 points are given to a country if budget surplus is betwen 2% and 2.9% of GDP and 9.5
points are assigned if budget surplus is between 3% and 3.9% of GDP. Therefore the effect of a
minimal change in budget balance/GDP, say from 2% to 2.1%, isnot reflected in the risk level
unless the ratio shifts from 2% to 3%. Along with the limitation of the data stated, since the risk
components have various weights, in this study, only the significance and direction of coefficients
are interpreted rather than the magnitudes.
For all subcategories of risk components, a lower score repres nts a higher level of risk and
a higher score represents a lower level of risk. Although politica risk components are criticized
of being subjective, economic and financial risk componentsare far from this criticism. For all
subcategories of both economic and financial risk components, the point assignment depends on
the magnitude of that particular variable. For example; current account/GDP point has a scale of
zero to fifteen for a range of -40% or below to 10% or more scale for current account/GDP ratio.
The higher the current account/GDP ratio is, the higher the points assigned for the component are,
which means that the lower the risk level is. To detail more, if a country’s current account surplus
is between 6% and 7.9% of her GDP, 14 points are given to the risk score for current account/GDP
component, and if a country’s current account deficit is betwe n 35% and 39.9% of her GDP, then
the country gets only 0.5 point. The same logic and pre-determined bin limits are applied to all
subcategories of economic and financial risk components.
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In this study, I include the subcategories of economic risk and the composite indices for fi-
nancial and political risk categories in the model since this paper focuses on the relative effects of
macroeconomic variables on country risk while controllingfor financial and political risks.
1.4 Model and Methodology
As explained in the data section, the estimation is done in two stages. At the first stage, a CAPM
is utilized to estimate country betas which are used as a proxy for country risk and at the second
stage, country betas are regressed on economic, financial and political variables to distinguish the
relative effects on country risk.
In the following subsections, I detail the estimation procedur along with the results.
1.4.1 Estimation of Country Betas
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) was developed by Sharpe in 1964 and is commonly used in
finance literature to quantify the relationship between thetwo distinct features of a stock; its risk
and return. A CAPM beta is to quantify the “systematic risk” ofa particular stock in relation with
the overall portfolio.
Here, I adopt the same approach to measure the systematic risk of a particular country in
comparison to the world. An international CAPM is defined as;
Rt =α + βtRwt + ǫt (1.1)
ǫt ∼N(0, σ2) (1.2)
whereRt is the national stock market return of a country,βt is the systematic risk measure for that
country,Rwt is the world stock market return andǫt is i.i.d. residual term.
Figure1.1shows national stock market returns for Germany from 1990:Mand from 1984:M1
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for the US, Canada, the UK, Singapore and global stock returns. Stock returns for all countries are
stationary and have time-varying variances. For all countries, the stock returns are more volatile
after 2008 crisis and during 1987 crash. Therefore I employ amultivariate GARCH model to
calculate time variant country betas which measure the sensitivity of stock returns of each country
with respect to the global returns.
Among multivariate GARCH models, A Dynamic Conditional Correlation Generalized Auto
Regressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (DCC-GARCH) model isused to estimate an improved
time variant country beta in existence of a dynamic correlation between the country’s stock return
and the world stock return since all countries in the study; the US, Canada, the UK, Germany
and Singapore, are included in the aggregated world stock mar et return. DCC-GARCH Model
is one of the latest members of GARCH family introduced by Engle(2002)3 and estimates the
time variant correlation coefficient between a country’s stock return and world stock return along
with time-variant variances of both. This property makes DCC-GARCH model a better fit to
estimate country betas since the correlation coefficient betwe n the world and a country quantifies
the integration of a country’s financial markets with the rest of the world and given that the time
period for the study is long enough to assume that the financial i tegration of each country varies
throughout the sample due to changes in both local and globaldyn mics.
Moreover, the countries in the study are selected accordingto their integration level with global
markets. All countries have a mean correlation coefficient of a range of 0.87 to 0.91; therefore I can
assume that all countries have similar financial integration levels. This assumption is particularly
important when it comes to ranking the countries in risk levels according to the magnitude of
country betas.
By using a DCC GARCH (1, 1) model, time-variant country betas are estimated from 1984:M1
to 2014:M12 for the US, Canada, the UK and Singapore and from 1990:M9 to 2014:M12 for
Germany. Table1.3 shows the descriptive statistics of and Figure1.2 plots country betas for all
3Appendix A summarizes Engle (2002)’s DCC GARCH framework
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countries. As clearly seen in Figure1.2, country betas reach at high levels during the 2008 financial
crisis. This result is consistent with Glova and Pastor (2013) and Yang et al. (2012). Glova and
Pastor (2013) state that country betas for Visegrad countries, including Czech Republic, Romania,
Hungary and Poland, reach the highest levels during 2008 whereas their volatility increases and
Yang et al. (2012) find the same results for BRICS.
Among the countries in the sample, Singapore shows the highest peaks and the volatility. Sin-
gaporean country beta reaches the highest level at 1987 stock market crash and stays higher than
the rest of the countries during 1998 Asian crisis. The fact tha Singapore is more sensitive to
global crises than the rest of the countries is attributed toher economy’s high dependency on inter-
national trade. Furthermore, Germany has the highest country be a levels starting from 2008 since
Germany is affected more from Eurozone debt crisis which followed 2008 global financial crisis.
The means for country betas range between 0.87 (the US) and 1.23 (Germany). A higher beta
refers to a higher return therefore a higher level of countryrisk. According to the comparison of
the means of time-variant country betas, country risk levelis the lowest for the US, followed by
Canada, the UK and highest for Singapore for period of 1984-2014. Also Germany has a high
mean beta of 1.23 for time period of 1990-2014. Moreover, Singapore has the highest volatility in
country risk level with a standard deviation of 0.47 whereasC nada has the least volatile country
risk level with a standard deviation of 0.17. Other than the US, none of the time-variant country
betas are normally distributed.
The next subsection details the second stage of the estimation in which the relative effects of
each economic variable along with the composite financial and political variables on country risk
level are estimated.
1.4.2 Effects of Macroeconomic Variables on Country Risk
At the second stage of the estimation, time-variant countrybetas are regressed on the growth
rates of a set of macroeconomic variables; budget balance asa percentage of GDP (BB), current
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account as a percentage of GDP (CA), GDP per capita (GDP )4 , inflation rate (π), along with the
composite financial risk (FR) and political risk (PR) variables.
Although stock markets are financial institutions and should react to financial risk, since ex-
pectations play an important role, it reacts not only to financi l risk but also economic and political
risk as well. This is evident by real time stock market movements to announcements of economic
policy changes and/or political news, like election results or civil wars. Besides, Blanchard (1981)
creates a theoretical model connecting economic policy shocks and stock market returns and ex-
plains that not only the economic policy implementations, but also the anticipation of the policy
changes affect the stock returns through aggregate demand and interest rate channels. Furthermore,
Arfaqui and Abaoub (2010), Basu et al. (2011), Yang et al. (2012), Andrade and Teles (2004),
Verma and Soydemir (2006), Glova and Pastor (2013) are amongthe empirical studies that explain
the movements in country betas by economic and financial indicators.
DCC-GARCH time variant country betas are used as a proxy for country risk level for each
country and an Autoregressive Distributed Lags (ARDL) Modelis used to estimate the relative
effects of variables on country risk. An ARDL model is used since the second step regression for
each country combines a mix of I(0) and I(1)series. An ARDL model enables us to use both I(1)
and I(0) series together and estimate the long-run forms in case of a cointegration. Before running
an ARDL model, I check if country beta series are stationary. Table1.4 shows three different
unit root test results for each country beta series. UK and USbetas have unit roots according to
a set of unit root tests; Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Philips-Perron (PP) and Dickey-Fuller
Generalized Least Squares (DF-GLS). UK and US betas are included in ARDL models as I(1) and
since there are a combination of I(0) and I(1) series, Bounds test is performed for all five ARDL
models for cointegration.5. According to Bounds Test results, Canada and Germany models have
4Real GDP growth is excluded from the model due to multicollinearity problem.
5ARDL Models are estimated for US and UK betas by using both at levels and first differences. Since the signs
and significance of the right hand side variables coefficients are same for both versions, here I report the results for the
models with I(1) dependent variables to keep the dependent variables comparable across countries.
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cointegration and therefore long-run forms are estimated for those two countries6. The following
subsection reports the results in details.











jXt + ǫt (1.3)
Xt =[BBt, CAt, GDPt, πt, FRt, PRt] (1.4)
whereβt is country beta for country i,BB is growth rate of budget balance as a percentage of
GDP,CA is growth rate of current account as a percentage of GDP,GDP is growth rate of GDP
per capita,π is percentage change in inflation rate,FR is growth rate of financial risk composite
index andPR is growth rate of political risk composite risk index. Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) is used in model selection and Table1.5shows the model specifications for all five countries.
Additionally, Table1.6summarizes the residuals, stability and model specification tests results for
all models.
1.4.2.1 Variable Selection
The variables in the ARDL model are chosen to include the main macroeconomic indicators for
a country with respect to capture fiscal and monetary policy,overall living standards, liquidity
position as well as the financial and economic structures.
BB: Growth rate of budget balance as a percentage of GDP is used as an indicator for fiscal
performance of an economy. This fiscal indicator representsdebt repayment ability of the Fed-
eral Government given a country’s national income level. Asshown in Table1.6, risk points are
assigned to certain levels of budget balance/GDP ratios andthe higher the budget surplus is the
higher the points are and vice versa. Since a large budget deficit gives the Federal government
more difficulty to honor the debt service and therefore increases the probability of default, one
6Table1.6summarizes the residuals, stability and model specification tests results.
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would expect to see a negative correlation between BB and country beta. Since a higher budget
surplus leads to a lower risk for an economy, which leads to a lower country beta, the coefficient
of BB is expected to be negative.
CA: Growth rate of current account as a percentage of GDP is usedas an economic indicator
representing liquidity position of a country. Current account balance; one of the two components of
balance of payments, consists of trade balance, net factor inc me and net transfers. Just like budget
balance/GDP, the risk points are assigned to certain levelsof current account/GDP. The higher
current account surplus/GDP ratio is the higher the points are. Since a higher current account
surplus indicates a better liquidity position for an economy, one would expect to see a negative
correlation betweenCA and country beta.
GDP : Growth rate of GDP per capita is included in the model as an economic measure for
the overall standards of living in a country. A higher GDP/capit leads to higher point for this
risk category and since countries with better living standards are considered less risky, one would
expect a negative correlation betweenGDP and country beta.
π: Inflation is included in the model as both an overall economic indicator measuring the
uncertainty in an economy and representing the stance of a country’s monetary policy. In ICRG
data, a lower inflation level gets higher points for this riskcategory and vice versa, a higher inflation
gets lower points. Since high-inflation countries are oftenpronounced with higher uncertainty
levels in investment episodes, therefore higher country risk levels, it is expected to see a negative
correlation betweenπ and country beta.
FR: Growth rate of financial risk composite index is included inthe model to measure the
overall health of financial risk in an economy. Although financi l risk category is composed of
various financial indicators from exchange rate stability to net international liquidity, only the
composite index is included in the model without further details of each subcategory, since the
focus of this study is on the relative effects of macroeconomic variables. Additionally, just like the
other risk components, a higher financial risk level is assigned lower points and higher points are
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given to countries with lower financial risk.
PR: Growth rate of political risk composite index is included in the model to control for all
non-financial and non-economic variables in a country. ICRG data h s an immensely detailed
political risk index which accounts for any political issuefrom corruption to religious tensions.
Moreover, according to ICRG risk points system, the higher thepolitical risk in a country is the
lower the points assigned to this index are. Therefore one would expect to see a negative correlation
between country beta and political risk variable.
1.4.3 Estimation Results
In this subsection, I report the estimation results. Table1.7shows the estimation results for all five
countries. Prior to the results, I would like to explain the independent variables used in the model
in order to understand the results better:
1.4.3.1 The US
Model specification of the selected ARDL Model is ARDL (1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 0, 1) which means the
model includes the first lag of the dependent variable country beta;βt−1, the first two lags ofBB
andCA, first lag ofGDP , inflation andPR, and the contemporaneous value of all independent
variables.
According to residuals, stability and model specification tests results summarized in Table
1.6, there is no serial correlation or heteroscedasticity problems, however the residuals do not
follow a normal distribution. Moreover, the coefficients are stable over time and there is no model
misspecification issue. Additionally; Bounds test indicates no cointegration and therefore the long
run form of the model is not estimated.
Table1.7shows the estimation output for all countries and accordingto US output, budget bal-
ance/GDP, current account/GDP, GDP per capita and inflationhave significant effects on country
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beta; therefore country risk level of the US.
Budget balance/GDP and inflation have expected effects on thecountry risk level. According to
the estimation output, the first two lags ofBB have negative effects on county beta which means a
higher budget deficit at time t-1 and t-2 decrease US beta, therefor country risk level. This finding
underlines the importance of fiscal policy in the US, especially after 2008 crisis when fiscal policy
is effectively used to stabilize the economy. Moreover a lower level of inflation, decreases the risk
level of the US.
The effect of a higher GDP/capita on the country risk is ambiguous for the US sinceGDP has
a positive coefficient concurrently but a negative coefficient at time t-1. Since both coefficients are
significant,according to the estimation output, the model is inconclusive about the effect of living
standards in the US on country risk level.
The impact ofCA; current account/GDP is quite unexpected. According to theestimation
results,CA has a positive significant coefficient both at time t-1 and t-2. In other words, a higher
current account deficit or a lower current account surplus decreases US country beta; therefore US
country risk. Given that a country faces a current account deficit when imports are higher than
exports (IM>EX), when US economy buys more goods and services from the rest of the world
than it sells, her country risk is perceived low by investors. According to the wald test results, the
coefficients of lagged values ofCA are jointly significant.
Both financial and political risk do not have significant effects on US county risk despite the
fact that the lagged values of political risk have expectantly negative coefficients.
The coefficient ofβt−1is 0.962 and significant at 1% which is the reason of a high adjusted
R2. Since a high adjustedR2might be a sign of multicollinearity problem, I check both Variance
Inflation Factors (VIF) and correlation coefficient matrix for explanatory variables. Both do not
show a sign of multicollinearity problem7.
7In the first form of the models, GDP growth rate variable is included in the model along with GDP/capita and
after test result indicated multicollinearity between thetwo variables, GDP growth rate is excluded from all models.
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1.4.3.2 Canada
Canadian country risk model is estimated for 1984:M1-2014:M12 period and Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) is used for model selection. According to AIC, as shown in Table1.5, an ARDL
(2, 4, 3, 1, 1, 2, 2) model is selected which means that the right hand side variables include 2 lags
of country beta, 4 lags ofBB, 3 lags ofCA, 1 lag ofGDP and inflation, and 2 lags ofFR and
PR as well as contemporaneous values of all independent variables.
According to the estimation output of Canada, in the short-run,BB, CA, GDP ,inflation and
financial risk have significant effects on country risk of Canada but unfortunately only the effects
of GDP and inflation are conclusive and expected.
The reason behind the significant effects of GDP per capita growth and inflation on Canadian
country risk might be due to the inflation targeting regime inCanada since 1991. Inflation targeting
has been the major economic policy in Canada to stabilize the economy after 1987 crash; “Black
Monday”. Bank of Canada has been applying inflation targeting policy quite successfully since
1991 and in 2011, Bank of Canada in collaboration with the governm nt decided to extend the
regime to the end of 2016. Therefore, in Canada, inflation rateis one of the major economic
indicators in terms of measuring the credibility of monetary uthority as well as the health of
overall economy.
According to the results in Table1.7, a higher GDP per capita growth rate and a lower inflation
rate decrease the Canadian country risk with a one month delay. By comparing the magnitudes
of the coefficients of these two factors, a deviation from themonetary policy target has a bigger
impact on the country risk than a change in the standards of living n Canada.
Although the coefficients ofBB, CA andFR are significant for many lags, the signs of the
coefficients change from lag to lag therefore it is difficult to conclude the direction of the impacts
of these variables.
Since in all models, a mix of I(1) and I(0) variables are employed together, despite the fact that
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in Canadian model all series are stationary, Bounds test is performed to check for the cointegration
relationships for all countries. According to the Bounds test r ult for Canada stated in Table1.6,
the variables are cointegrated.
Therefore I estimate the long-run model to see the interaction between macroeconomic vari-
ables with country risk of Canada in the long-run. Table1.8shows the log-run form of the model.
According to the results, any change in economic variables has a significant impact on country
risk of Canada only in the short-run; however, in the long run Caadian country risk is not af-
fected. Newey-West residuals are used in the model therefor, as seen in Table1.6, there is no
homoscedasticity issue. I also checked the correlogram up to 36 lags to better see if the residuals
are autocorrelated. According the correlogram, Durbin Watson test statistics and Breusch-Godfrey
LM test results, the residuals are not autocorrelated. VIF show no sign of multicollinearity be-
tween the explanatory variables. Additionally CUSUM test reults show that the parameters are
stable for the given time period. However the residuals are not normally distributed.
1.4.3.3 The UK
UK country beta model is estimated for 1984:M1-2014:M12 period and AIC is used for model
selection. According to AIC, an ARDL (1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 2, 0) is selected to estimate the effects of
economic, financial and political risk on country beta of theUK. Given the vector of explanatory
variablesXt = [BBt, CAt, GDPt, πt, PRt], the model includes the first lag of the dependent
variable; UK country beta itself as well as contemporaneousvalues ofBB, CA, inflation and
political risk variables, current value and first lag ofGDP , and current value and the first two lags
of financial risk variables.
According the model results stated in Table1.7, among the risk components included in the
model,BB, GDP andFR have significant effects on UK country risk. I believe the economic
stabilization steps that British government has taken since1992 recession in the UK explains the
significant impacts of these variables on country risk in theUK for the estimation period.
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After 1992 recession, British government took serious policy steps by keeping taxes relatively
low and loosening the labor market regulations in order to increase the economic growth rates in
the UK. British government successfully increased and kept GDP per capita growth rates higher
than the other G-6 countries for 1997-2007 period. Following this economic prosperity decade,
British economy was affected from 2008 global crisis severely and had to partly nationalize a
group of financial institutions. Since 2010, British government pursued an austerity program to cut
the budget deficit which decreased from 11% to 5% for the last 5years. To go back to the results, a
higher Budget Surplus/GDP, a higher GDP/capita growth rate and lower financial risk decrease UK
country risk significantly. All of the significant coefficients for the risk components have expected
signs. The comparison of the magnitudes of the coefficients tlls us that financial risk and growth
rate of GDP/capita have bigger impacts on UK country risk than budget balance/GDP.
Since the first lag of country beta has a significant coefficient of 0.958, the adjustedR2 is 0.924.
A high adjustedR2might be a sign of multicollinearity problem, therefore I che k both Variance
Inflation Factors (VIF) and correlation coefficient matrix for explanatory variables. Both do not
show a sign of multicollinearity problem.
Apart from the multicollinearity, I check the DW test statistic , correlogram and Breusch-
Godfrey LM test results for autocorrelation and none of the statistics shows evidence in favor of
serial correlation problem. Table1.6 shows the residuals, stability and model specification tests
results. Briefly, according to the tests results, the parameters are stable and the model has no
misspecification.
1.4.3.4 Germany
German country risk model is estimated for 1990:M9-2014:M12 period and AIC is used for model
selection. The specification of the selected model is ARDL (1,1, 2, 0, 5, 0, 1). According to the
model results, German country beta is explained by the first lag of itself, the first lags ofBB and
PR, the first two lags ofCA, the first five lags ofπ as well as the contemporaneous values of all
20
independent variables.
According to the estimation results, the growth rates of budget balance/GDP, current account/GDP,
inflation rate and political risk have significant effects onGerman country risk. Except for the cur-
rent account/GDP, the directions of the effects of macroeconomic and political variables are as
expected.
In details, a higher budget surplus or a lower budget deficit decreases the country risk in Ger-
many. Additionally a lower inflation rate has a negative effect on country beta and thereby lowers
country risk with a five month delay.
Also political risk has a negative significant effect on country risk. A lower political risk
decreases German country beta thereby lowers country risk level. Furthermore; given the magni-
tudes of the coefficients, inflation and political risk components have bigger impacts on country
risk compared to the growth rates of budget balance/GDP and current account/GDP.
Among the sample of countries in this study, Germany is the only e whose political risk
has a significant effect on country risk. Since the sample includes advanced and newly indus-
trialized countries, having political risk no significant effect on country risk is expected due to
stable political structures for these countries. However th time period of Germany used in this
study explains why political risk has a significant negativeeff ct on country risk. The period of
1990:M9-2014:M12 includes sensitive political events in German political and economic history
starting with the reunification of West and East Germany in the second half of 1990.
Unexpectedly,CA has a positive significant effect on German country risk for two consecutive
lags. The interpretation of these coefficients is as follows: a higher current account deficit or a
lower current account surplus decreases German country beta; namely reduces country risk level
in Germany. Therefore; just like in the US and Singapore, that I talk about in the next subsection,
when Germany imports more goods and services than it exports, the country risk level decreases.
Furthermore, as seen in Table1.6, the Bounds test result shows that the variables in German
country risk model are cointegrated. Therefore, I estimatethe long-run form of the model. Ac-
21
cording to the long-run coefficients, shown in Table1.8, the growth rates of budget balance/GDP,
current account/GDP and inflation have significant effects on country risk in Germany in the long-
run as well; whereas the effect of political risk becomes insig ificant. Given the magnitudes of the
coefficients, inflation has a bigger impact on country risk thanBB andCA.
The residual tests results for Germany in Table1.6 show no sign of multicollinearity, het-
eroscedasticity and serial correlation issues. Additionally, ccording to CUSUM test, model pa-
rameters are stable and Ramsey RESET test result shows that there is no model misspecification.
The coefficient ofβt− 1 is 0.872 and significant at 1% which leads to a high adjustedR2 of
0.877. Since a high adjustedR2might be a sign of multicollinearity problem, I check both Variance
Inflation Factors (VIF) and correlation coefficient matrix for explanatory variables. Both do not
show a sign of multicollinearity problem.
1.4.3.5 Singapore
Despite the fact that Singapore has the highest GDP growth rates accompanied by the lowest un-
employment rates in our sample of countries, she also has themost volatile country beta implying
the highest risk in the sample for 1980-2014 time period. Possible economic reasons behind this
controversy are her being the youngest economy among all in our sample with a highly inter-
national trade and FDI dependent economic structure. Singapore has the quarterly GDP growth
rates as high as 36% and as low as -11% for 2007-2014 time period. Despite the positive outlook
that a double digit growth rate creates, high volatility of economic parameters reflects an unsta-
ble economic trend for Singapore. This makes Singapore the highest risk country in our sample.
Singaporean country risk model is estimated for 1984:M1-204:M12 period and AIC is used for
model selection. According to AIC, and an ARDL (1, 3, 2, 4, 0, 0, 0) is selected to estimate the
effects of economic, financial and political risk on Singaporean country beta. Given the vector
of explanatory variablesXt = [BBt, CAt, GDPt, πt, FRt, PRt], the model includes the contem-
poraneous values of all explanatory variables as well as thefirst lag of the dependent variable;
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Singaporean country beta itself, three lags of BB, two lags of CA, and four lags of GDP.
According to the model results, BB, CA and GDP have significant effects on country risk
in Singapore. The effects ofBB andGDP on Singapore country risk are inconclusive due to
alternating signs of coefficients of different lags, whereas inflation and political risk components
have expected impacts on Singapore country risk even thoughthe coefficients are insignificant.
Moreover,CA has a positive significant effect on Singaporean country beta, namely a higher
current account surplus increases Singaporean country risk and, vice versa, a reduction in current
account surplus decreases Singaporean country beta, therefore country risk. At first, this result
might sound unexpected as one would think of a higher currentaccount surplus as a good eco-
nomic indicator, but given persistent, and large current account surplus/GDP ratios that Singapore
has since 1988, the sign of the coefficient captures the sensitivity of Singaporean economy well.
A persistently high current account surplus over years generally indicates an unbalanced economy
and, in Singapore, arises as a result of a high export dependent/driven growth model. This export
dependent structure of Singaporean economy makes the country highly responsive to global eco-
nomic imbalances. As seen from Figure1.2, Singaporean country beta responds to 1987 stock
market crash, 1998 Asian crisis, 2008 Great Recession and endof 2009 Eurozone crisis more
largely than the rest of the countries in the sample regardless of which country/region the crisis
originated from. Additionally, a firmly higher export than import is an indication of an unbalanced
economy in which household consumption and/or government spending are low.
According to the model specification and stability tests results, shown in Table1.6, model
parameters are stable, and there is no model misspecification, Furthermore, residual tests, DW
test statistics, correlogram and VIF show no sign of multicollinearity, serial correlation and het-




In this section, I check if the results of the study are sensitive to the methodology employed to
measure country betas. As an alternative to DCC-GARCH, a Kalman Filter approach is adopted to
estimate time-variant country betas in the first stage and then Kalman country betas are regressed
on the same set of economic, political and financial variables to see if the direction of the impacts
change.
1.5.1 An Alternative Estimation Method: Kalman Filter Approach
State space models have been widely used in both finance and eco omics literature for a various
econometric issues including estimation of time-variant parameters. Kalman Filter is a recursive
form of state space models in time series, estimating the optimal state vector. The state space
representation of CAPM is stated as:
The observation equation;
Yt =ZtBt + vt vt ∼ N(0, σ) (1.5)
The state equation;
Bt =ΦBt−1 + εt εt ∼ N(0,Ξ) (1.6)
whereBt represents the time-variant country betas (to make the comparison, I call time-variant
country betas estimated by Kalman filter as Kalman country betas from now on) , andvt andεt are
i.i.d error terms and uncorrelated at all lags.
Figure1.3 shows the comparison of DCC-GARCH country betas and Kalman country be as
for each country separately. As seen from the figures, country betas estimated by two different
approaches follow quite similar trends for all countries for the same time periods.
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Table 1.9 summarizes the descriptive statistics of Kalman country betas for the same time
periods as the original model. Descriptive statistics of Kalman country betas are quite similar to the
statistics of DCC-GARCH country betas, stated in Table 3. The US has t e lowest average country
beta and Singapore has the highest volatility in country risk, same as DCC-GARCH estimation
results.
1.5.2 Relative Effects of Macroeconomic Variables on Country Risk
Once time-variant country betas are estimated by using Kalman filter, they are regressed on the
same set of economic, political and financial variables. An ARDL model is used to estimate the
relative effects of each risk component on the country risk for each country.











jXt + ǫt (1.7)
Xt =[BBt, CAt, GDPt, πt, FRt, PRt] (1.8)
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is used in model selectiona d Table 1.10shows the model
specifications for all five countries and Table1.11summarizes the residuals, stability and model
specification tests results for all models.
1.5.3 Estimation Results
In this subsection, I report the estimation results of the alt rnative model and compare the direction




AIC is used to specify the model and an ARDL (1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2) model is selected. Table
1.12 shows the estimation results of the model. According to the results,BB, CA, π andFR
have significant effects on US country risk. The directions of the relative impacts of each risk
component on country betas of the US are almost same as the original model. A higher budget
surplus decreases US country risk, whereas a higher currentaccount surplus increases. While
country risk increases as a result of a higher inflation rate,the impact ofGDP on US country risk
is inconclusive due to alternating signs ofGDP coefficients. Although these results confirm the
findings of the original model, unlike the original model, inthe alternative model, the impact of
financial risk on country beta is significant. The estimationoutput of the alternative model shows
that a higher financial risk has a significant effect on US country beta, therefore increases US
country risk.
Table1.11summarizes the residual, stability and model specificationtests results for all Kalman
country beta models. According to the tests results, US Kalman country beta model does not have
heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity and serial correlation problems. Furthermore, Ramsey RESET
test indicates that there is no model misspecification and Bounds test result shows no evidence in
favor of cointegration.
1.5.3.2 Canada
According to AIC, and ARDL (1, 3, 3, 0, 0, 1, 0) model is selected.The results of the alternative
model confirm the findings of the original model.BB, CA, π andFR have significant effects
on Canadian country beta. Like the original model results, the effects ofBB andCA are sig-
nificant but unfortunately inconclusive due to alternatingsi ns of the coefficients. Additionally,
GDP has a negative effect on Canada country beta, implies that a higher GDP/capita growth rate
decreases Canadian country beta, therefore, decreases Canadian country risk despite the fact that
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the coefficient is not significant.
The only dissimilarity between the original and the alternative model is the effect of financial
risk component. In the original model, the results were inconclusive about the impact of financial
risk on Canadian country beta due to alternating signs of the coeffi ients for different lags. How-
ever, the alternative model concludes that a lower financialrisk decreases country beta, thereby
country risk of Canada.
According to the residuals, stability and model specification est results stated in Table1.11, the
model does not have heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, multicollinearity and misspecification
problems with stable parameters. Moreover, Bounds test result indicates no cointegration.
1.5.3.3 The UK
AIC is used for model specification and an ARDL (1, 0, 2, 0, 0, 1, 0) is selected. The results of the
alternative model for the UK country risk are aligned with the findings of the original model except
for the effect ofBB. In the original model a higher budget surplus decreases theUK country risk
whereas in the alternative model, it does not a significant impact on UK country beta.
The rest of the findings are quite similar to the original model since a lower financial risk, a
higher GDP/capita growth rate and a lower current account deficit/GDP decrease UK country beta,
thereby, UK country risk.
According to the residuals, stability and model specification test results stated in Table1.11,
the model does not have heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, multicollinearity, misspecification
and cointegration issues and parameters are stable for the estimation period.
1.5.3.4 Germany
According to AIC, an ARDL (1, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0) model is selected. The alternative model results are
same as the original model results for Germany for the same tie period of 1990:M09-2014:M12.
BB, CA andPR have significant effects on Germany country risk. In detail,a higher budget
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surplus, a lower current account surplus and a higher political r sk increase German country beta.
These findings are aligned with the findings of the original model.
However, unlike the original model, Bounds test result does not i dicate a cointegration re-
lationship. The residual, stability and model specification tests results are shown in Table1.11.
According to the tests results, the model does not have heterosc dasticity, serial correlation, multi-
collinearity, misspecification and cointegration issues and parameters are stable for the estimation
period.
1.5.3.5 Singapore
AIC is used for model selection and an ARDL (1, 1, 1, 3, 0, 0, 0) model is selected. The signs of
the coefficients of the alternative model are quite similar to those in the original model. Accord-
ing to the estimation output of the alternative model, budget balance/GDP, current account/GDP,
GDP/capita and political risk have significant effects , however the results are inconclusive about
the direction of the impact of GDP/capita growth rate, aliketh original model.
In line with the original model, a higher current account surpl s increases Singaporean country
risk. A Bounds test is performed for all models in the study andthe test result of the alternative
model for Singapore indicates cointegration between variables. Table1.8summarizes the long-run
form of the model. In agreement with the short-run model for Singaporean country risk, in the
long run a higher budget surplus/GDP and a lower current account surplus decrease the country
risk in Singapore.
Table1.11states the residual, stability and model specification tests results which indicate that
the model does not have heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, multicollinearity and misspecifica-
tion problems, and parameters are stable for the estimationperiod of 1984-2014.
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1.6 Conclusion
Given the number of multinational companies, increasinglyglobal financial markets and cross
border investment opportunities even for small size investors, measuring the country risk becomes
a more and more important challenge not only for global investors but also for policy makers
and researchers. In this paper, I use country beta approach tquantify the country risk for five
advanced economies and question what the relative impacts of economic, financial and political
risk components on country risk are.
To do so, I use a Capital Asset Pricing Model to estimate the tim-variant country betas by
employing a DCC-GARCH approach, for the US, the UK, Canada, Germany and Singapore. Com-
pared to static estimates, a time-variant country beta better reflects not only the dynamic structure
of country risk but also of global financial integration of each country. These country betas are
used to quantify country risk. Then, at the second stage of the estimation, I look deeper into the
triggers of a higher country risk. To do so, time-variant country betas are regressed on a set of
macroeconomic variables; the growth rates of budget balance/GDP, current account balance/GDP,
inflation rate, GDP per capita and inflation, along with the growth rates of composite financial and
political risk measures for the US, the UK, Canada and Singapore and Germany.
The empirical findings of the study show that, even though thesignificance and the direction
of the impacts of risk factors differ from one country to another, among macroeconomic variables,
budget surplus and current account surplus have significanteffects on most country betas whereas,
generally, political risk does not have a significant effecton country risk in advanced economies.
Although there are a fair number of empirical studies employing country beta approach to
quantify the country risk, they have a common limitation of cmparing country betas for countries
of different financial integration level. This study contributes to the existing literature by comparing
the countries of similar financial integration levels and examining the relative impacts of economic
and financial indicators while controlling for political risk. This is quite important since omitting
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political risk might create a bias in the results.
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Table 1.1: ICRG Data Description
ICRG Country Risk Data Description High Risk Low Risk
Political Risk Minimum Points Maximum Points
Government Stability 0 12
Socioeconomic Conditions 0 12
Investment Profile 0 12
Internal Conflict 0 12
External Conflict 0 12
Corruption 0 6
Military in Politics 0 6
Religious Tensions 0 6
Law and Order 0 6
Ethnic Tensions 0 6
Democratic Accountability 0 6
Bureaucracy Quality 0 6
100
Economic Risk
GDP per Head 0 5
Real GDP Growth 0 10
Annual Inflation Rate 0 10
Budget Balance as a Percentage of GDP 0 10
Current Account as a Percentage of GDP 0 15
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Financial Risk
Foreign Debt as a Percentage of GDP 0 10
Foreign Debt Service as a Percentage of Exports of Goods and Services 0 10
Current Account as a Percentage of Exports of Goods and Services 0 15
Net International Liquidity as Months of Import Cover 0 5




Table 1.2: Point System for Risk Level of Budget Balance as a Percentage of GDP
Budget Balance as a Percentage of GDP Points
4.0 or plus 10
3.0 to 3.9 9.5
2.0 to 2.9 9
1.0 to 1.9 8.5
0.0 to 0.9 8
-0.1 to -0.9 7.5
-1.0 to -1.9 7
-2.0 to -2.9 6.5
-3.0 to -3.9 6
-4.0 to -4.9 5.5
-5.0 to -5.9 5
-6.0 to -6.9 4.5
-7.0 to -7.9 4
-8.0 to -8.9 3.5
-9.0 to -9.9 3
-10.0 to -11.9 2.5
-12.0 to -14.9 2
-15.0 to -19.9 1.5
-20.0 to -24.9 1
-25.0 to -29.9 0.5
-30.0 below 0
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Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics of DCC GARCH Country Betas
βCANADA βGERMANY βSINGAPORE βUK βUS
Mean 0.91 1.23 1.08 1.05 0.87
Median 0.88 1.33 0.97 1.05 0.87
Maximum 1.79 2.19 3.32 1.59 1.40
Minimum 0.56 0.19 0.01 0.60 0.41
Std. Dev. 0.17 0.34 0.47 0.19 0.19
Skewness 1.24 -0.55 1.58 -0.18 -0.03
Kurtosis 6.07 2.83 6.98 2.61 2.88
Jarque-Bera 241.19 15.25 399.11 4.40 0.28
Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.87
Sum 336.77 357.02 399.53 389.17 321.41
Sum Sq. Dev. 11.18 33.37 80.29 13.37 12.71
Observations 371 291 371 371 371
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Table 1.4: Unit Root Test Results

















TEST VALUE -10.84 -5.93 -3.18 -1.68 -3.89 -4.03 -2.73 -4.71 -2.62 -4.55
PROB 0 0 0.02 0.44 0 0 0.07 0 0.09 0
PP
TEST VALUE -11.19 -5.93 -2.85 -1.67 -3.85 -3.86 -2.66 -4.72 -2.65 -4.64
PROB 0 0 0.05 0.44 0 0 0.08 0 0.08 0
DF-GLS
(ERS)
TEST VALUE -10.85 -0.05 -3.19 -0.95 -3.88 -2.51 -2.73 -1.92 -2.62 -0.49
PROB 0 >0.1 <0.01 >0.1 <0.01 <0.05 <0.01 <0.1 <0.01 >0.1
Table 1.5: Model Selection for DCC GARCH Country Beta Models
β BB CA GDP π FR PR CONSTANT TREND
The US 1 2 2 1 1 0 1 Y N
The UK 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 Y N
Canada 2 4 3 1 1 2 2 Y Y
Germany 1 1 2 0 5 0 1 Y Y
Singapore 1 3 2 4 0 0 0 Y N
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Table 1.6: Residuals and Stability Test Results
Residual
\Stability Test: Test Null Hypothesis Probability(test statistic)
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Table 1.7: DCC GARCH Beta Models-Estimation Outputs
βUS βUK βCANADA βGERMANY βSINGAPORE
βt−1 0.962*** 0.958*** 0.425*** 0.872*** 0.915***
βt−2 - - 0.121** - -
BBt -0.025 -0.037* -0.355 -0.094 0.048
BBt−1 -0.085*** - -0.625** -0.291** -0.1**
BBt−2 -0.076*** - 0.855*** - -0.18***
BBt−3 - - 0.514* - 0.129***
BBt−4 - - 0.431** - -
CAt -0.121 -0.054 0.125 0.282 0.143
CAt−1 0.186*** - 0.819** 0.645*** 0.353
CAt−2 0.147* - -0.455 0.311** 0.872**
CAt−3 - - -0.656** - -
GDPt 0.327*** -0.021 0.035 0.023 0.033
GDPt−1 -0.179*** -0.128** -0.304** - -0.444*
GDPt−2 - - - - -0.768**
GDPt−3 - - - - 0.161
GDPt−4 - - - - 0.812**
πt 0.017 0.043 0.046 -0.266 -0.036
πt−1 -0.195** - -0.813* -0.633 -
πt−2 - - - -0.382 -
πt−3 - - - 0.055 -
πt−4 - - - -0.600 -
πt−5 - - - -1.225** -
FRt 0.027 0.039 1.372** -0.109 1.042
FRt−1 - 0.190 -1.171* - -
FRt−2 - -0.164** -1.544** - -
PRt -0.337 -0.131 -1.260 0.028 -0.089
PRt−1 -0.424 - - -1.36* -
PRt−2 - - - - -
C 0.032*** 0.044*** 0.372*** 0.07** 0.09***
TREND - - 0.0002*** 0.000377*** -
PROB(F ) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.931 0.926 0.378 0.884 0.858
ADJR2 0.928 0.924 0.342 0.877 0.851
DW 1.890 2.001 2.011 2.057 2.001
Variable Definitions:BB: Budget Balance as a percentage of GDP,CA: Current Account
as a percentage of GDP,GDP : Growth rate of GDP per capita,π: Inflation rate,FR:
Financial Risk,PR: Political Risk.
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Table 1.8: Long Run Forms
βDCC−CANADA βDCC−GERMANY βKALMAN−SINGAPORE
BBt 1.803 -3.013** -5.257***
CAt -0.365 9.689** 11.713*
GDPt -0.593 0.182 0.316
πt -1.690 -23.861* 1.84
FRt -2.953 -0.852 17.505
PRt -2.772 -10.436 24.807*
C 0.819*** 0.549*** 0.868***
TREND 0.00049*** 0.003*** 0.000
Variable Definitions:BB: Budget Balance as a percentage of GDP,CA: Current
Account as a percentage of GDP,GDP : Growth rate of GDP per capita,π: Inflation
rate,FR: Financial Risk,PR: Political Risk.
Table 1.9: Descriptive Statistics of Country Betas-Kalman Filter Estimation
βCANADA βGERMANY βSINGAPORE βUK βUS
Mean 0.84 1.23 0.86 1.05 0.83
Median 0.88 1.35 0.80 1.06 0.86
Maximum 1.33 1.68 2.67 1.35 1.17
Minimum -0.50 0.55 -0.84 0.42 0.16
Std. Dev. 0.23 0.32 0.52 0.13 0.16
Skewness -1.26 -0.45 0.50 -0.45 -0.77
Kurtosis 7.81 1.70 4.96 4.31 3.29
Jarque-Bera 455.84 30.10 74.84 38.86 38.03
Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sum 310.45 358.07 318.11 390.28 309.23
Sum Sq. Dev. 20.33 28.81 100.26 6.24 9.70
Observations 371 291 371 371 371
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Table 1.10: Model Selection for Kalman Beta Models
β BB CA GDP π FR PR CONSTANT TREND
US 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 Y Y
UK 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 Y Y
Canada 1 3 3 0 0 1 0 Y Y
Germany 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 Y Y
Singapore 1 1 1 3 0 0 0 Y N
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Table 1.11: Residuals and Stability Test Results-Kalman Beta Models
Residual
\Stability Test: Test Null Hypothesis Probability (test statistic)
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Table 1.12: Results for Kalman Beta Models-Estimation Outputs
βUS βUK βCANADA βGERMANY βSINGAPORE
βt−1 0.965*** 0.977*** 0.954*** 0.956*** 0.911***
BBt -0.05*** 0.012 -0.252*** -0.108** -0.185***
BBt−1 -0.067*** - 0.064 - -0.282***
BBt−2 0.003 - 0.234*** - -
BBt−3 - - 0.2** - -
CAt 0.091*** -0.015 0.262** 0.331*** 0.181
CAt−1 0.094 0.014 0.049* 0.188*** 0.86**
CAt−2 -0.004 -0.06*** -0.216* 0.104 -
CAt−3 - - -0.247** - -
GDPt -0.060 -0.039* -0.059 -0.040 -0.273
GDPt−1 0.011 - - - -0.430
GDPt−2 0.062 - - - -0.146
GDPt−3 - - - - 0.876**
πt -0.128** -0.031 -0.385** -0.034 0.164
πt−1 -0.134 - - - -
πt−2 -0.021 - - - -
FRt 0.003 0.070 -0.131 -0.012 1.556
FRt−1 -0.119** -0.059** -0.403* - -
FRt−2 -0213* - - - -
PRt -0.235 -0.042 0.481 -0.714** 2.206*
PRt−1 -0.071 - - - -
PRt−2 -0.017 - - - -
C 0.027** 0.028* 0.031*** 0.016 0.077***
TREND 0.000 0.000 0.00005* 0.0002*** -
PROB(F ) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.945 0.969 0.944 0.973 0.857
ADJ −R2 0.942 0.097 0.941 0.972 0.852
DW 1.824 1.955 1.962 2.019 2.065
Variable Definitions:BB: Budget Balance as a percentage of GDP,CA: Current Account as a percent-




This section summarizes Engle (2002)’s DCC-GARCH framework which is used to estimate the
time-variant country betas at the first stage of this study. In order to calculate the time-variant
betas, the following equations are estimated:
rt is the return vector of a portfolio ofn assets and can be defined as;







wherevt = [v1t, v2t, v3t, ...., vnt]′ andvt ∼ N(0, In)
In DCC-GARCH,Ht, the time-variant conditional standard deviations matrixis defined as;
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in whichQt reflects the structure of the dynamics andγ
−1
t rescales the elements ofQt to satisfy
|qij| ≤ 1 condition.
Qt = (1− α− β)Q̄+ αut−1u
′
t−1 + βQt−1 (1.13)
whereQ̄ = E(utu
′
t) and,α andβ are scalars.



























































The Effects of Fiscal Policy on Stock Market
Returns: A Sectoral View
2.1 Introduction
The severity of recent global financial crisis which was triggered in US financial markets and
spread gradually to the rest of the world required policymakers to employ fiscal policy side by side
with monetary policy to stabilize the economy. Particularly during the Eurozone crisis recovery,
policymakers vastly employed fiscal stimulus packages in order to stabilize the financial markets at
the cost of long term stability of public debt despite the Maastricht Criteria. These implementations
of fiscal policy as a cure for financial crises led the researchers to examine the linkage between
fiscal policy and financial markets.
What is the correlation between financial markets and fiscal policy? How do fiscal policy
shocks affect stock markets returns? In this paper, I try to answer these questions by employing
a Structural Vector AutoRegressive Model for 1975:Q1 to 2013:Q2 period in the US. This study
analyzes not only the effects of fiscal policy shocks on aggregate stock market returns but also on
sectoral returns for energy, financial, utility, industrial and healthcare sectors.
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Although there are a sufficient number of studies examining the relationship between monetary
policy shocks and stock market returns, relatively few studies efine the correlation between fiscal
policy shocks and asset markets and there is no consensus on the magnitude and direction of effects
of an expansionary fiscal policy shock on stock market returns. This paper aims not only to fill this
gap but also to contribute to the existing literature by raising a new question about the impact of a
fiscal policy shock. Do all sectoral returns move in the same direction with aggregate stock market
return? Is there a co-movement between the reactions of different sector indices as a result of an
expansionary fiscal policy shock?
This study shows that aggregate stock market returns decrease as a result of a positive govern-
ment spending shock and increase as a result of a positive government revenue shock in the US
between 1975 and 2013. This paper also shows that sectoral returns do not necessarily move in
the same direction along with aggregate stock market returns as a response to a fiscal policy shock.
While the stock returns of energy and utility sectors react the same way as aggregate stock market
returns, financial sector returns respond in opposite direction.
More interestingly, healthcare and industrial sector returns respond completely different than
the rest of the sectoral returns. Both positive government spending and positive government rev-
enue shocks increase healthcare sectoral returns and decreas stock returns of the industrial sector.
This article is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces,s ction 2 reviews the literature briefly,
section 3 describes the data and the model, section 4 presents th results and robustness check, and
section 5 concludes.
2.2 Selected Literature
Blanchard (1981) develops a model emphasizing the joint response of and the interaction between
output, stock market and term structure interest rate to a change or announcement of a change in
monetary and fiscal policy. The real value of stock market is defined as the ratio of anticipated
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profit to discount rate. Since both profit and interest rate are increasing functions of output, and
output increases in case of an expansionary fiscal policy, the net effect of a higher output on stock
market returns is ambiguous. Stock market returns decreaseif th interest rate effect dominates
which is calledbad news case, and increase if the profit effect dominates which is calledgood news
case.
Blanchard (1981) underlines that anticipation and rationalexpectations play an important role
in the joint response of output and stock market to a change inpol cy since not only the implemen-
tation of the policy which follows the announcement, but also the announcement itself leads to a
change in expected rate of profit and interest rate. The net response of stock market is a matter of
whether an increasing profit or an increasing interest rate effect compensates the other one in case
of an expansionary fiscal policy.
Shah (1984) is another theoretical paper on the effects of fiscal policy on stock market. The
paper tracks the long-term jump between two steady state values of stock market interrelated to
a change in investment level as a result of a money-financed fiscal policy change. Shah (1984)
underlines the veridicality of comprehending the model with a variable stock of capital instead of
Blanchard (1981)‘s assumption of a constant capital stock. Nonetheless, the study focuses on long
term impact of a change in money-financed fiscal policy, rather t an short-term consequences of a
debt-/tax-financed policy shock, which is the main questionof this paper. Shah (1984) concludes
that in the long term a money-financed fiscal expansion does not affect the stock market value
which remains unchanged despite a lower level of capital stock. Additionally, in the short term,
the response of stock market to a fiscal policy shock varies under different circumstances.
Not only the theoretical, but the empirical studies on the topic are inconclusive about response
of stock market returns to a change in fiscal policy. Empirical studies on the topic can be divided
into categories with respect to different reasons assigning the direction of the response of stock
market returns to fiscal policy shocks.
The first group of the studies states that in order to ascertain the direction of the response of
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stock market returns to a fiscal policy shock, the interaction between fiscal and monetary policies
has to be taken into account and should be studied in one framework. Even so, the empirical studies
in which monetary and fiscal policy interaction is modeled, show no consensus on the direction of
stock market response.
Darrat (1990), Chatziantoniou et al. (2013) and Jansen et al.(2007) analyze the effects of
monetary and fiscal policy jointly and their empirical evidenc shows that an expansionary fiscal
policy has a negative impact on stock market return. Jansen et al. (2007) utilizes the flexibility of
a semi-parametric approach arguing that as fiscal policy acts as a binding constraint on monetary
policy, it is insufficient to employ a parametric model whereas Darrat (1990) employs multivariate
Granger Causality Approach and Chatziantoniou et al. (2013) use a Structural VAR Model. The
empirical findings of this paper also show a negative effect of an expansionary fiscal policy by
employing a SVAR Model.
Although Tavares and Valkanov (2003) and Arin et al. (2009) also take the interaction between
fiscal and monetary policy into account, they show that the stock market return increases as a
result of an expansionary fiscal policy innovation. Arin et al. (2009) employ a VAR model to
investigate the relative impacts of various tax policies inthe US, Germany and Japan and show that
the magnitude of the impact of indirect taxes on stock marketreturn is higher than the magnitude
of the impact of labor taxes as the impact of corporate taxes is ins gnificant due to a firms ability
to switch between equity and debt financing.
Akitoby and Stratmann (2008) draw attention to the choice offiscal policy variable and claim
that employing fiscal deficit as one variable instead of distingu shing government revenue and
expenditure, can be a misleading indicator. Although it is supportive of Akitoby and Stratmann
(2008)‘s argument that the empirical works1 which include budget deficit as the only fiscal variable
and agree on the negative effect of an increasing budget deficit on stock returns, the claim is not
sound enough since there is no consensus on the net impact of an exp nsionary fiscal policy among
1Darrat (1990), Jansen et al. (2007) and Agnello and Sousa (2010).
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the studies in which fiscal policy variable components are distinguished. In this paper, I investigate
the effects of government spending and revenue separately to avoid this limitation.
Finally, Afonso and Sousa (2011) include the feedback from gvernment debt along with the
government revenue and government spending and argue that the sign of the stock market return
depends if the analysis is controlled by public debt. Their study state empirical evidence in favor
of a negative correlation between an expansionary fiscal policy and stock returns. In this paper, I
employ SVAR framework which utilizes the identification restrictions of Afonso and Sousa (2011)
and control for public debt as well. The direction of the response of stock market return to a change
in fiscal policy is consistent with the results of the benchmark model of Afonso and Sousa (2011).
This paper contributes to the existing empirical literature by not only focusing on the response
of aggregate stock market returns but also sectoral stock returns for five major sectors; financial,
industrial, healthcare, utility and energy. The results show that there is no co-movement between
the stock returns of different sectors as a result of a fiscal policy shock.
2.3 Data and the Model
2.3.1 The Empirical Model and Methodology
I analyze the relationship between fiscal policy shocks and stock market returns by employing the
same SVAR Model from Afonso and Sousa(2011). I first replicate their model for aggregate stock
returns and then employ the same model to define the reactionsof sectoral returns for five super
sectors in US economy as a result of a fiscal policy shock.
A SVAR model is employed to analyze the effects of fiscal shocks on stock market returns
because of endogeneity problem.
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Model is defined as;
AXt =A
∗(L)Xt−1 + B
∗Zt + ǫt (2.1)
Aut =ǫt (2.2)
Xt =[G, T, π, i,HR, SR]
′ (2.3)
Zt =[FederalDebt,D1987, D1990, D1997.D2000, D2002, D2008, D2010] (2.4)
whereXt is the endogenous variable set andZt is the exogenous variable set. D1987 is the time
dummy for 1987 Black Monday, D1990 is for early recession, D1997 is for Asian financial crises,
D2000 is for Dotcom bubble, D2002 is for stock market downtur, D2008 is for 2008 global
economic crises and D2010 is for European sovereign debt crises. ǫt is the vector of structural
shocks,ut is the vector of reduced form residuals,Xt is the vector of endogenous variables,G is
government spending,T is government revenue,π is inflation rate,i is the interest rate,HR is
housing return andSR is stock market return.
The endogenous variable set includes the variables selected by Afonso and Sousa (2011). Gov-
ernment spending and government revenue are proxies for fiscal policy, inflation rate is a proxy
for monetary policy, interest rate is the transmission channel to the stock markets as defined in
Blanchard (1981). Housing return is included in the model since Afonso and Sousa (2011) spec-
ifies that the interaction between the housing market and stock market affects the stock market’s
reaction to policy shocks.
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I use quarterly data from 1975:Q1 to 2013:Q2 for the US. The variables included in the model are
US government spending, US government revenue, inflation rate, housing prices, aggregate stock
market return and sectoral returns.
Nominal government spending and investment, and nominal government revenue series from
Bureau of Economic Analysis-NIPA Tables are used as proxies for government spending and gov-
ernment revenue. US Treasury constant maturity rate from Federal Reserve of St. Louis is used for
interest rate. Housing price index is provided from Office ofFederal Housing Enterprise Oversight.
For stock market returns, S&P 500 and S&P Dow Jones sectoral indices are employed to cal-
culate aggregate and sectoral stock returns. AdditionallyFederal Debt series from the Federal
Reserve Bank of St Louis is used to calculate federal debt variable and included as an exogenous
variable in the model. All variables are in natural logarithms and deflated by inflation rate.
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2.4 Results and Robustness Check
2.4.1 Results for Aggregate Stock Returns
First, SVAR model is estimated from 1975:Q1 to 2013:Q2 and the impulse response functions of
inflation rate, interest rate, housing return2 and aggregate stock market return to positive govern-
ment investment and government revenue shocks are calculated. Figure2.7 and Figure2.8 show
the responses of variables to positive government spendingand government revenue shocks for
period 1975-2013.
As a result of a positive government investment shock, both inflat on rate and housing return
decrease and vice versa, as a result of a positive governmentrevenue shock, both inflation rate and
housing return increase. These results are consistent withhe result of Agnello and Sousa (2007).
Unfortunately due to the unavailability of a shorter frequency data for fiscal policy variables,
quarterly data is used in the analysis. Since stock market immediately adjusts to shocks, the effect
diminishes within a short period of time after the shock. Therefore, only the direction of the first
jump of the return is observed in order to analyze how stock market return responds.
Stock market value is defined as the net present value of expected future profits which is the
ratio of aggregated future profits to discount rate. Also, since both profit and interest rate are
increasing functions of output, and output increases as result of an expansionary fiscal policy, the
sign of the response of stock market returns is assigned by the dominant effect. Stock market
returns decrease when interest rate effect dominates the profit effect and increase when the profit
effect compensates more than the effect of an increasing interest rate.
As a result of a positive government investment shock, interest ate increases with a quarter
delay after the shock while aggregate stock return decreases. As expected, as a result of a positive
tax shock, stock market return increases as interest rate decr ases. The responses of aggregate
2The original model from Afonso and Sousa (2001) emphasize the importance of the interaction between housing
and stock markets. To capture this interaction, housing return is included in the model but the study does not focus on
the response of housing return. Therefore, the response of housing return is not detailed in the rest of the paper.
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stock market return and interest rate are consistent with the results of Afonso and Sousa (2011).
Although the responses of interest rate and aggregate stockmarket return follow opposite pat-
terns, since there is a time gap between the announcement andthe implementation of the policy
and stock market responds faster to changing expectations compared to interest rate, which moves
as output moves after the actual implementation of the policy, the responses of interest rate and
stock market returns are not synchronized.
2.4.2 Results for Sectoral Returns
In order to calculate the response of each sectoral return, Ire-estimate the SVAR model by al-
ternating the stock market return variable and calculate the impulse response functions of each
sectoral return to positive government investment and tax shocks. Since the sectoral indices are
available only after 1990:Q1, first, I re-estimate the SVAR Model for aggregate stock market return
to check for subsample stability for period 1990:Q1-2013:Q2. The model includes 4 lags and 2008
quarterly dummies and federal debt as exogenous variables.
Figure2.3and Figure2.4show that, for period 1990-2013, the responses of variablesto a fiscal
policy shock follow a similar pattern to the period 1975-2013. Stock market return, housing return
and inflation rate increase as a result of a positive government investment shock and decrease as a
result of a positive government revenue shock.
Once the model is shown to be stable for the subsample of 1990-2013, it is employed to estimate
the responses of returns of utility, energy, financial, healt c re and industrial sectors. Figure2.5
represents the responses of utility and energy sector returns o fiscal shocks.
Energy and utility sectors respond to fiscal policy shocks following a similar pattern to the
response of aggregate stock market return. Energy sector return decreases within a quarter after
the shock and the effect vanishes away after the first quarters a result of a positive government
investment shock, and increases as a result of a positive govrnment revenue shock. Although
utility sector return responds negatively to a positive change in government investment and nega-
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tively to a positive change in tax revenue, the response comes with a quarter delay and becomes
significant temporarily at the second quarter. The delay in response of utility sector implies that
actual implementation of the policy is more effective than the announcement of the policy change.
Figure 2.6 represents the impulse response functions of financial, heathcare and industrial
sector returns. As clear from the impulse response functions, there exists no co-movement between
the sector returns to a fiscal policy innovation.
Financial sector return response is opposite to aggregate stock returns. Financial sector return
increases as government spending goes up and decreases as tax revenue goes up. The expectation
of higher future profits dominates the effect of higher interest rate and therefore, financial sector
returns move in the same direction with profit.
Unexpectedly, healthcare and industrial sectors do not respond to different shock in opposite
directions. Healthcare sector return increase as a result of both positive government investment
and tax revenue shocks. An intuitive explanation for an increasing healthcare sector return can be
driven from the fact that healthcare sector is a government subsidized sector. For this reason, both
a higher government spending and a higher tax revenue indicate a higher subsidy rate; therefore a
higher future profit for healthcare sector.
On the other hand, industrial sector return follows a more pessimistic pattern and decreases as
a result of both an expansionary and a tight fiscal policy. An intuitive explanation for this response
might be the fact that investors are more pessimistic about the future profits of the industrial sector
as a result of a fiscal policy change.
2.4.3 Robustness Check
There is insufficient number of theoretical frameworks modeling the relationship between fiscal
policy and stock market performance, moreover; the empirical literature on the topic is inconclu-
sive about the effects of fiscal policy changes on stock markets returns. According to Afonso and
Sousa (2011), the response of stock market return is sensitive to the model specification if the
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model does not control by public debt. Therefore, I adopt a similar SVAR Approach to Afonso and
Sousa (2011) and include the federal debt as an exogenous variable in the model.
In this section, I examine if the responses of variables including both aggregate and sector re-
turns change when the model is estimated without debt feedback. As the next step, I re-estimate
both the model for aggregate stock returns for 1975-2013 period and the model for sectoral re-
turns for 1990-2013 period without the debt feedback. Also,given that the model includes both
government spending and revenue in the endogenous variableset, not only the effects of existence
but also the exogenity pf federal debt variable is questionable, I believe exclusion of federal debt
variable can clear up both discussions.
Figure2.7 and Figure2.8 represent the impulse response functions of inflation rate,housing
return, interest rate and aggregate stock market return for1975-2013 period when debt variable
is excluded from the estimation. All variables follow the same response as the original with debt
feedback. Inflation rate, housing return and aggregate stock returns decrease as result of a positive
government spending shock, and increase as a result of a positive tax shock.
Figure2.9and Figure2.10show the impulse response functions for sectoral returns when debt
feedback is excluded. Similarly, sector returns give the same responses to fiscal policy shocks
when the debt feedback is excluded from the model. Utility and e ergy sectors follow the same
pattern with aggregate stock returns whereas financial sector return responds in opposite direction.
Moreover; healthcare sector return increases and industrial ector return decreases as a result of
both policy changes. However, the magnitude of the responses of sector returns are stronger when
debt feedback is excluded.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the effects of fiscal policy shocks on both aggregate stock market and
sectoral returns in the US for period 1975-2013. The empirical findings of the paper show that
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in case of a positive government investment shock; inflationrate, housing return and aggregate
stock market return decrease whereas interest rate increases. A expected, a positive government
revenue shock increases both housing return and aggregate stock market returns.
However, neither sectoral stock returns react to policy shocks in the same direction, nor there
observed a comovement between the reactions of stock returns of different sectors. Among five
sectoral returns employed in the analysis, only energy and utility sector returns move in the same
direction with aggregate stock returns. Financial sector return response is quite the opposite of
aggregate stock return response. A positive government investment shock increases financial sector
return while a positive tax shock decreases.
The behavior of industrial and healthcare sectors is worthwhile since they give the same re-
sponses to counter shocks. Both positive government spending and positive government revenue
shocks decrease industrial sectoral returns whereas increase healthcare sectoral returns.
These findings state empirical evidence in favor of a negative impact of expansionary fiscal
shocks on stock market performance. Additionally, since the particular effect of fiscal shocks on
sectoral returns have not been investigated, I believe thiss udy fills the gap in the literature.
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APPENDIX: Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS)3
Energy Sector: The Energy Sector comprises companies engaged in exploration & production,
refining & marketing and storage & transportation of oil & gasand coal & consumable fuels. It
also includes companies that offer oil & gas equipment and services.
Industrial Sector:The Industrial Sector includes manufacturers and distributors of capital
goods such as aerospace & defense, building products, electrical equipment and machinery and
companies that offer construction & engineering services.It also includes providers of commercial
& professional services including printing, environmental and facilities services, office services &
supplies, security alarm services, human resource & employment services, research & consulting
services. It also includes companies that provide transportati n services.
Health Care Sector: The Health Care Sector includes health care providers & servic s, com-
panies that manufacture and distribute health care equipment & supplies and health care technol-
ogy companies. It also includes companies involved in the res arch, development, production and
marketing of pharmaceuticals and biotechnology products.
Financial Sector: The Financial Sector contains companies involved in banking, thrifts &
mortgage finance, specialized finance, consumer finance, asst management and custody banks,
investment banking and brokerage and insurance. This Sector also includes real estate companies
and REITs.
Utilities Sector: The Utilities Sector comprises utility companies such as electric, gas and
water utilities. It also includes independent power producers & energy traders and companies that
engage in generation and distribution of electricity usingrenewable sources.
3Sector definitions are taken from Morgan Stanley Capital International Resource Center website:
https://www.msci.com/resources/pdfs/GICSSectorDefinitio s.pdf
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Figure 2.1: Impulse Response Functions for 1975-2013 Period
(a) Response of Government Revenue to a
Positive Government Spending Shock
(b) Response of Government Spending to a
Positive Government Revenue Shock
(c) Response of Inflation to a Positive Gov-
ernment Spending Shock
(d) Response of Inflation to a Positive Gov-
ernment Revenue Shock
(e) Response of Housing Return to a Posi-
tive Government Spending Shock
(f) Response of Housing Return to a Posi-
tive Government Revenue Shock
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Figure 2.2: Impulse Response Functions for 1975-2013 Period
(a) Response of Interest Rate to a Positive
Government Spending Shock
(b) Response of Interest Rate to a Positive
Government Revenue Shock
(c) Response of Aggregate Stock Market Re-
turns to a Positive Government Spending
Shock
(d) Response of Aggregate Stock Market
Returns to a Positive Government Revenue
Shock
60
Figure 2.3: Impulse Response Functions for 1990-2013 Period
(a) Response of Government Revenue to a
Positive Government Spending Shock
(b) Response of Government Spending to a
Positive Government Revenue Shock
(c) Response of Inflation to a Positive Gov-
ernment Spending Shock
(d) Response of Inflation to a Positive Gov-
ernment Revenue Shock
(e) Response of Housing Return to a Posi-
tive Government Spending Shock
(f) Response of Housing Return to a Posi-
tive Government Revenue Shock
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Figure 2.4: Impulse Response Functions for 1990-2013 Period
(a) Response of Interest Rate to a Positive
Government Spending Shock
(b) Response of Interest Rate to a Positive
Government Revenue Shock
(c) Response of Aggregate Stock Market Re-
turns to a Positive Government Spending
Shock
(d) Response of Aggregate Stock Market
Returns to a Positive Government Revenue
Shock
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Figure 2.5: Impulse Response Functions for Sectoral Returns without Debt Feedback
(a) Response of Utility Sector Returns to a
Positive Government Spending Shock
(b) Response of Utility Sector Returns to a
Positive Government Revenue Shock
(c) Response of Energy Sector Returns to a
Positive Government Spending Shock
(d) Response of Energy Sector Returns to a
Positive Government Revenue Shock
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Figure 2.6: Impulse Response Functions for Sectoral Returns
(a) Response of Financial Sector Returns to
a Positive Government Spending Shock
(b) Response of Financial Sector Returns to
a Positive Government Revenue Shock
(c) Response of Healthcare Sector Returns
to a Positive Government Spending Shock
(d) Response of Healthcare Sector Returns
to a Positive Government Revenue Shock
(e) Response of Industrial Sector Returns
to a Positive Government Spending Shock
(f) Response of Industrial Sector Returns
to a Positive Government Revenue Shock
64
Figure 2.7: Impulse Response Functions for 1975-2013 Periodwithout Debt Feedback
(a) Response of Government Revenue to a
Positive Government Spending Shock
(b) Response of Government Spending to a
Positive Government Revenue Shock
(c) Response of Inflation to a Positive Gov-
ernment Spending Shock
(d) Response of Inflation to a Positive Gov-
ernment Revenue Shock
(e) Response of Housing Return to a Posi-
tive Government Spending Shock
(f) Response of Housing Return to a Posi-
tive Government Revenue Shock
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Figure 2.8: Impulse Response Functions for 1975-2013 Periodwithout Debt Feedback
(a) Response of Interest Rate to a Positive
Government Spending Shock
(b) Response of Interest Rate to a Positive
Government Revenue Shock
(c) Response of Aggregate Stock Market Re-
turns to a Positive Government Spending
Shock
(d) Response of Aggregate Stock Market
Returns to a Positive Government Revenue
Shock
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Figure 2.9: Impulse Response Functions for Sectoral Returns without Debt Feedback
(a) Response of Utility Sector Returns to a
Positive Government Spending Shock
(b) Response of Utility Sector Returns to a
Positive Government Revenue Shock
(c) Response of Energy Sector Returns to a
Positive Government Spending Shock
(d) Response of Energy Sector Returns to a
Positive Government Revenue Shock
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Figure 2.10: Impulse Response Functions for Sectoral Returnswithout Debt Feedback
(a) Response of Financial Sector Returns to
a Positive Government Spending Shock
(b) Response of Financial Sector Returns to
a Positive Government Revenue Shock
(c) Response of Healthcare Sector Returns
to a Positive Government Spending Shock
(d) Response of Healthcare Sector Returns
to a Positive Government Revenue Shock
(e) Response of Industrial Sector Returns to
a Positive Government Spending Shock
(f) Response of Industrial Sector Returns
to a Positive Government Revenue Shock
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Chapter 3
International Effects of US Government
Spending Shocks: The Case of Canada
3.1 Introduction
One of the lessons of the 2008 crisis has been, once again, to highlig t the international interde-
pendence of economies. Not only do international markets have a tremendous impact on domestic
markets, but domestic policies are transmitted on a global level. This is even more relevant now
when most industrialized economies are poised to or have already embarked on fiscal retrench-
ment. In an age where monetary policy is less reliable, how isfiscal policy transmitted abroad?
What are the effects of US fiscal policy on both domestic and foreign markets? To answer these
questions, in this study, I aim to characterize the internatio l effects of US fiscal expansion. More
specifically, I examine the effects of US government spending shocks on output and consumption
levels in the US, as well as, in Canada from 1957 to 2013. Empirical esults of the paper show that
during the period of 1957-2013, a positive US government spending shock is positively transmitted
to her trading partner. As a result of domestic fiscal expansion, output and consumption levels in
both countries increase. There are different theories on the reasons and transmission channels of
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the positive international transmission of domestic policies.
Most of the theoretical models accept the case that domesticconomic policies can be trans-
mitted to other countries both positively and negatively. The main dissimilarity of the theories is
the international transmission channel of domestic policies. According to the traditional Mundell-
Fleming model, the milestone of the theoretical literature, th direction of the international trans-
mission of a domestic fiscal shock depends on the exchange rate regime the home country is under
since the exchange rate is defined as the transmission channel. Briefly, a domestic fiscal expan-
sion is transmitted negatively to trading partners under a flexible exchange rate regime, reflecting
a “beggar thy neighbor” effect. Vice-a versa, domestic output, as well as, foreign output increases
as a result of a domestic fiscal expansion under a fixed exchange r te regime.1
In contrast to the Mundell-Fleming Model, Svensson (1987) claims that given the production
capacity of the home country, the spillover effect of domestic fiscal expansion on foreign output
depends on whether home and foreign goods are Edgeworth Pareto complements or substitutes,
and whether the domestic government finances domestic fiscalexp nsion by a monetary expansion
or tax revenue. If home and foreign goods are Edgeworth Pareto complements, a domestic fiscal
expansion is transmitted positively. In other words, both foreign output and consumption levels
increase when there is underconsumption of home goods. If there is a liquidity shortage in the
domestic market, then a domestic fiscal expansion has no effect on consumption and output levels
in either domestic or foreign economies. In the third case, when domestic production is at full
capacity, an increase in domestic government spending is tran mitted negatively to the foreign
country. In this case, both foreign output and consumption levels decrease, but it has no effect
on the domestic macroeconomic parameters. It is the opposite when home and foreign goods are
Edgeworth substitutes. Svensson (1987) also adds that, unlike the Mundell Fleming Model, neither
the exchange rate nor the terms of trade are the international ransmission channels of domestic
fiscal policies. Instead, the consumption of home and foreign goods is defined as the transmission
1See Fleming (1962) and Mundell (1968) for more details.
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channel.
Another two-country general equilibrium model shows that te direction and the channel of the
international transmission of domestic fiscal shocks depend on the structure of the international
assets market (Betts and Devereux (1999)). If the internatiol assets market is complete, then a
domestic fiscal expansion is transmitted positively to the for ign economy. As a result both foreign
and domestic output levels increase, whereas consumption levels in both countries fall.
Despite the lack of consensus regarding the spillover effects of domestic fiscal policy shocks, it
is widely accepted that domestic fiscal expansion does affect trading partners. In the next section,
selected empirical literature on the international transmis ion and the domestic effects of fiscal
policy is reviewed. Since the theoretical models are inconclusive and empirical literature on the
international transmission of fiscal policy is still in its infancy, I believe that this study helps to
fill in this gap, contributing to the empirical literature byexamining the domestic and international
effects of US government spending shocks. I anticipate thatthis study will provide motivation for
further empirical studies on this topic.
This paper is structured in four sections. Section 2 gives information about the empirical liter-
ature on the international and domestic effects of US fiscal policy. Section 3 explains the data, the
methodology and the empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
3.2 Selected Empirical Literature
There are a remarkable number of empirical studies on the domestic effects of US fiscal shocks.
Although in most of the macroeconomic models, it is shown that an expansionary fiscal policy
increases domestic output level and therefore appreciatesthe domestic currency, there is no con-
sensus about the effects of an expansionary fiscal policy on private consumption. According to
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), one of the most recent studies on this topic, a positive government
spending shock increases both US output and private consumption levels. Gali et al. (2007) also
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confirm these results and question the infinitely-lived Ricardian household assumption of the Real
Business Cycle models which claim that private consumption falls in case of a positive government
spending shock. Both papers employ the Structural Vector AutoRegression (SVAR) technique to
identify the fiscal shocks.
In contrast, Perotti (2007) argues that Blanchard and Perotti (2002) find a positive response
of private consumption to a fiscal expansion because of the methodology used to identify fiscal
shocks. Perotti (2007) claims that it is important to insulate the “abnormal” fiscal events, such as
war and post-war periods, in order to obtain the “normal” responses of other endogenous variables
to a fiscal shock. He employs both dummy variable and SVAR approaches and shows that the
dummy variable approach where abnormal fiscal events can be isolated gives results in favor of a
negative response of private consumption. However, the SVAR approach with the same variables
and for the same data period confirms the earlier findings of Blanch rd and Perotti (2002). This
robustness check supports his arguments.
Ramey (2011) is another study criticizing the standard VAR identifying restrictions of Blan-
chard and Perotti (2002) and alternatively adopts Ramey-Shapiro narrative approach to identify
the effects of government spending shocks. She argues that in the standard VAR approach em-
ployed by many empirical papers on the topic, the shocks are missing the timing of the shocks and
likewise Perotti (2007), she adds that anticipated and unanticipated shocks have different effects
on domestic consumption. Since an increase in defense spending is anticipated several quarters
before it actually occurs and it explains most of the volatility n government spending, she creates
a military date variable which is a dummy variable for “war dates” and analyzes the effects of
a shock to the military date variable on private consumptionand output levels. As a result of a
positive shock to defense spending, domestic output goes upwhereas private consumption goes
down. Although the empirical results of the study are consistent with the argument that anticipated
defense spending shocks affect private consumption negativ ly, the study generalizes the results
for non-defense government spending shocks as well and fails to distinguish between the effects
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of non-defense and defense spending shocks.
Aarle et al. (2003) and Muller (2008) also examine the domestic impacts of US fiscal spend-
ing shocks with the Vector AutoRegression (VAR) methodology.Aarle et al. (2003) adopt the
identification restriction that there is no accumulated effect of government spending shocks on
US output level in the long-run. Therefore, the study does not present any impact of a positive
government spending shock on US output. However, Muller (2008) states findings in favor of
an increase in output and private consumption levels as a response to a positive US government
shock. The study adopts Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002) identification restriction, which states that
government expenditure does not respond to shocks sourced by other endogenous variables simul-
taneously. Empirical results of Muller (2008) are also in line with Blanchard and Perotti (2002); a
positive US government spending shock increases US output and consumption levels and thereby
the US dollar appreciates.
Despite a voluminous literature on domestic effects of fiscal policy, the empirical literature on
international fiscal interdependence is still in its infancy with only a handful of studies examin-
ing the topic. Canzoneri et al. (2003) modifies Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002) VAR model for
domestic transmission in order to obtain both domestic and spillover effects of US fiscal shocks
while preserving the baseline identification restrictions. They examine the effects on US output
and consumption levels as well as the effects on output and the real exchange rate of Italy, France
and the UK. They state findings in favor of a positive transmision of US fiscal shocks to the three
European economies. As a result of a positive US government spending shock and a negative
tax shock, all three European countries face higher output levels accompanied by a depreciation
in their currencies. These results are consistent with the results of this study. I also find empiri-
cal evidence in favor of a positive transmission of US governme t spending shocks to Canada as
Canadian output rises while the US dollar appreciates.
Corsetti and Muller (2011), one of the most recent studies on the topic, examine the effects of
a positive US government spending shock on the Euro Zone and the UK as well as the US econ-
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omy itself. For domestic transmission of fiscal shocks, theymake a comparison of two different
identification schemes; the standard VAR approach introduce by Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
and the narrative approach by Ramey (2011). They find that the responses of domestic macroe-
conomic variables are similar although the magnitudes are slightly different. For the international
transmission of the fiscal policy shocks, they define the asset markets as the transmission channel,
therefore include the real interest rate of the US in the model and examine the effects of US fiscal
policy shocks on output levels of the UK and the Euro Zone. As aresult, both UK and European
output levels go up. Even though, the interest rate is definedas the transmission channel, bilateral
exchange rates are included in the estimation and hence the variance decomposition is not spec-
ified in the study, it is not clear if US government spending shocks are transmitted through the
interest rate or the exchange rate channel. In this study, I define the bilateral exchange rate as the
transmission channel.
Another study on the transmission of US fiscal shocks to Canadais Arin and Koray (2009).
The results of Arin and Koray (2009) are in favor of a negativeransmission, which is called
a “beggar thy neighbor” effect. They claim that domestic fiscal policy is transmitted through
exchange rate and interest rate channels to Canada. Impulse-response functions of the SVAR model
for period 1961:Q1-2004:Q4 show that a positive fiscal shockin the US leads the real exchange
rate to appreciate; US output level to increase; but, in contrast, Canadian output to fall. This result
is inconsistent with the empirical findings of this study. The limitation of Arin and Koray (2009)
is the identification restrictions defining US fiscal shocks since the restrictions do not depend on
any theoretical framework or previous empirical studies onb th the domestic and spillover effects
of US fiscal expansion. In this study, I adopt the baseline ident fication restrictions of Blanchard
and Perotti (2002), which are widely used in empirical research, for domestic transmission, and of
Canzoneri et al. (2003) to characterize the international effects.
To the best of my knowledge, Beetsma et al. (2006) is the only study that employs a panel VAR
approach to analyze the international spill-overs of fiscalpolicy shocks. They examine the interna-
74
tional effects of a domestic fiscal expansion within European Union countries and find empirical
evidence in favor of a positive international transmissionof a domestic fiscal expansion. They
show that the magnitude of the effect of a domestic fiscal expansion on foreign output depends on
the size of the economy from which the shock is originated. Larger economies such as Germany
have bigger impacts on relatively smaller economies. Due tothe dimensionality problems, the
effect is estimated in three steps. First they create a panelmodel which they refer as “fiscal block”
analyzing the effects of a fiscal expansion on domestic output. Second they create an independent
panel model called a “trade block” analyzing the relationship between domestic output and foreign
exports. Finally they translate the movements in foreign exports into changes in foreign output.
Although the study has the advantage of analyzing 14 European countries at a time, since the esti-
mation is not done in one single model, it is not clear that theeff ct on foreign output is sourced by
a domestic fiscal shock or a positive foreign export shock. Another limitation of the study is that
they use annual observations and adopt Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002) identification restrictions
which are stated to be valid only for quarterly data and not valid for annual data. In this study, a
two-country structural VAR is estimated by using quarterlydata.
Given the limited number of empirical studies on the international transmission of domestic
fiscal policy shocks, I believe that this study helps to fill inthis gap, contributing to the empirical
literature by examining the domestic and international effects of US government spending shocks
on her biggest trading partner, Canada for a long period of time by employing Blanchard and
Perotti’s (2002) identification restriction on a quarterlydata. I anticipate that this study will provide




In this section, I estimate a Structural VAR model and compute the associated impulse response
functions to understand the effects of a positive US governmnt spending shock on both US and
Canadian output and consumption levels. To do so, quarterly data are used from 1957:Q1 to
2013:Q1. Table3.1 defines the series and variables used in this study. US government consump-
tion expenditure and gross investment data, which aggregates federal, local and state government
consumption expenditure, and gross investment, is defined as government spending. To find real
GDP and real consumption of the US, nominal GDP and nominal household consumption of the
US are deflated by US GDP deflator, respectively and are definedin US dollars (USD). Nominal
GDP and nominal household consumption of Canada are deflated by Canadian GDP deflator in or-
der to find real GDP and real consumption levels of Canada, respectively. Canadian variables are
defined in Canadian dollars (CAD). All series, except for government consumption and investment
expenditure are obtained from the International Monetary Fund-International Financial Statistics
(IMF-IFS) online database. US government consumption and investment data are obtained from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis/US department of Commerce. Additionally, the real exchange
rate is employed in the model and is calculated as the nominalexchange rate multiplied by US
Consumer Price Index and divided by Canadian Consumer Price Index.
This study employs the SVAR Model to estimate the effects of US government spending on
countries consumption and output levels as well as the real exchange rate since the VAR estimation
technique is one of the most common estimation methods in order to investigate the dynamic
effects of policy changes on macroeconomic parameters in existence of endogeneity. Most of the
empirical studies on international fiscal transmission employ VAR models to estimate the effect of
policy shocks.2
2Arin and Koray (2009) and Ramey (2011) employ unrestricted VAR Models, Canzoneri et al. (2003) employ a
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3.3.2 The Model and Methodology
The SVAR Model comprises real GDP and real consumption levels for each country, US real
government consumption and investment expenditure and thereal exchange rate. In addition to
these endogenous variables, the model includes exogenous variables such as seasonal dummies.
Additionally, dummies for 1990 and 1991 for the recession inCanada, 1988 for the free trade
agreement between Canada and the US, and 1994 and 2008 for the global recession years are
added to the model.
Before creating the SVAR model, I check if all variables are stationary. Table3.2 shows the
unit root test results for each variable. Both Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips Perron
(PP) unit root tests are performed. The unit root test results show that none of the variables are
stationary when measured in levels. Therefore, I take the first difference of all variables; both test
results show that all differenced variables are stationaryat 1%significance level. For this reason,
the first differenced variables are placed in the SVAR model.
The model is defined as:
AXt =A
∗(L)Xt−1 + B
∗Zt + ǫt (3.1)
Aut =ǫt (3.2)
Zt =[seasonaldummies,D1990, D1991, D1988, D1994, D2008] (3.3)
whereXt = [∆g,∆y,∆c,∆e,∆y∗,∆c∗]′ is the vector of endogenous variables,L is the lag oper-
ator,ǫt is the vector of structural shocks andut is the vector of reduced form residuals.Zt is the
set of exogenous variables for time dummies; D1990 and D1991are 990 and 1991 Recession in
Canada, D1998 is for 1998 Free trade agreement between Canada and the US, D1994 and D2008
are for 1994 and 2008 Global economic crises, respectively.
Structural VAR Model whereas Beetsma et al. (2006) employ a Panel VAR Model.
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For identification, I adopt the identification restrictionsof Blanchard and Perotti (2002) on
the dynamic effects of US government spending shocks on domestic variables. Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) use institutional information about the taxand transfer systems, and the timing of
tax collections in order to measure the “reaction time” thatpolicymakers need to adjust fiscal policy
as a response to a GDP shock. They find that policymakers need more than a quarter to adjust the
fiscal policy, if any, to stabilize output fluctuations. It isalso stated that this assumption holds
for quarterly data, but not necessarily for annual data since fiscal policy can respond to an output
shock within a year. Therefore, US government spending is set as the most exogenous variable in
the model and not affected by any of the variables contemporane usly. US government spending
shocks affect all US variables including the real exchange rat . Since the real exchange rate is a
bilateral variable, it is affected by both US and Canadian output shocks.
Moreover, in regards to the transmission of US government spending shock to Canada, I adopt
the identification restrictions of Canzoneri et al. (2003). They state that US fiscal policy does not
have a direct impact on foreign country’s output, but has an indirect impact through the real ex-
change rate and its direct impact on US GDP. Therefore, Canadioutput and consumption levels
are affected by US output shocks but not US government spending shocks contemporaneously.
Since the US economy is larger than the Canadian economy, the identification restriction that US
economic variables are not affected by but affect Canadian eco omic variables is a reasonable
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assumption.
Having identified an appropriate structure for the model, I test for the validity of identification
restrictions since model is overidentified. According to LRtest result, the identification restrictions
are valid. Then, I estimate the SVAR Model and compute the impulse response functions to analyze
the dynamic effects of US fiscal shocks on the US and Canada. Theresults are stated in the
following subsection.
3.3.3 Empirical Results
Impulse response functions of the model are estimated. Figure3.1shows the responses of US gov-
ernment spending, US output, US consumption, Canadian output, Canadian consumption and the
real exchange rate, to a one unit shock to US government spending, respectively. The horizontal
axis denotes time measured in quarters and the vertical axesare stated in US dollars for US vari-
ables, in Canadian dollars for Canadian variables and in percentag points for the real exchange
rate.
For period 1957:Q1-2013:Q1, as a result of a one unit shock toUS government spending, US
output increases by USD1.73 in the first quarter. The effect on US output reaches a peak at the
second quarter and starts to diminish gradually after that.The increase in US output becomes
USD1.43 at the third quarter and dies off at the end of the fifthquarter after the shock. This finding
is similar to the result of Canzoneri et al. (2003) who analyzethe dynamic effects of US fiscal
policy after 1975. They find that US GDP increases by USD0.90 within a quarter and USD1.30 in
twelve quarters as a response to a one dollar increase in US government spending. This result is
also consistent with Blanchard and Perotti (2002) since theyfind a USD0.84 increase in US output
within a quarter, increasing to a peak of USD1.30 within fifteen quarters as a result of a one dollar
increase in US government spending for period 1960- 1997.
In contrast to the Real Business Cycle (RBC) models, US household consumption increases
due to a positive government spending shock and follows a similar pattern to the response of US
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output. As a response to a one dollar government spending shock, US household consumption
rises by USD0.37 within a quarter and reaches a peak at the second quarter after the shock. This
equals to 25% of the increase in US output. Similarly, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) predict a
USD0.50 increase in private consumption within a quarter. Moreover, as a response of a positive
US government spending innovation, Canzoneri et al. (2003) predict an increase of USD0.35 in
private consumption at the end of the fifth quarter and this increase reaches a peak of USD1.50
after three years.
The impulse response function of the real exchange rate shows the change in the real exchange
rate in percentage points as a result of a domestic fiscal expansion. Due to a one dollar government
spending shock, the real exchange rate appreciates by 0.9% at the end of the first quarter after the
shock. The appreciation in the real exchange rate is effective over a year after the shock and dies
off at the end of the fourth quarter. Canzoneri et al. (2003) also presents empirical evidence in
favor of appreciation of the US dollar against other currenci s as a result of a positive fiscal shock.
They state that the spillover effect of a positive US governme t spending shock on Italy, the United
Kingdom and France is a depreciation of the lira, pound and franc, respectively.
To analyze the international effects of US government spending shock, I examine the responses
of Canadian GDP and consumption to a positive government spending shock. An expansionary
US government spending shock has a positive effect on Canadian output. There is a two-quarter
delay between the response of US output and Canadian output. As a result of a one dollar shock to
US government spending, Canadian output increases by CAD0.19at the end of the second quarter
and reaches a peak of CAD0.50 at the end of the fourth quarter after the shock. This increase in
Canadian output is 11% of the response of US output within a quarter. This finding constitutes
empirical evidence in favor of a positive transmission of domestic fiscal shocks to trading partners.
This result is parallel to Canzoneri et al. (2003). They present empirical evidence in favor of a
positive international transmission of US government expenditure shocks as they find that GDP
of the UK, Italy and France increase by 70%, 38% and 75%, respectively, of the increase in US
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GDP due to a one dollar US government spending shock. Additionally, Beetsma et al. (2006)
and Corsetti (2011) find empirical results in favor of a positive transmission of a domestic fiscal
expansion.
Despite of having a persistent effect on Canadian output, a positive US government spending
shock does not change Canadian household consumption consistently. The response of Canadian
consumption accumulates for three quarters and becomes significant only temporarily at the fourth
quarter after the shock. At the fourth quarter, it has a peak effect of CAD0.08 which is 44% of
the response of Canadian GDP. These findings show that a positive innovation to US government
spending has positive effects on not only the US economy but also on her trading partner, Canada.
3.3.4 Robustness Check
For the robustness check, first, I reestimate the model from 1972 to 2013 to question the subsample
stability of the results. Second, I adopt an alternative identification scheme to see if the positive
response of Canadian output to a US fiscal expansion is affected by the identification scheme.
First, I reestimate the SVAR Model for subsample 1972:Q1-203:Q1 to understand the impacts
in the post Bretton Woods Era. Figure3.2shows the impulse response functions of the SVAR esti-
mation for this period. The results are quite consistent andin the same direction as the analysis for
period 1957:Q1-2013:Q1. A positive shock to US government expenditure increases US output
and consumption and the real exchange rate appreciates. Thishock is positively transmitted to
the Canadian economy; both GDP and household consumption in Canada increase due to a pos-
itive government spending innovation in the US. As a response to a positive US spending shock,
Canadian output goes up by CAD0.29, which is 15% of the increasein US output within a quarter
for the given period.
Second, I check if the identification scheme affects the results. To do so, I consider the iden-
tification scheme of Ramey (2011) which states that a positiveUS government spending shock
increases US output but decreases household consumption. She argues that the standard VAR
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identification, which is introduced by Blanchard and Perotti(2002), is the reason why most empir-
ical studies find that US consumption increases as a result ofa d mestic fiscal expansion and adds
that this identification scheme of US government spending shocks lacks the “timing” of the shocks.
Since defense spending is the source of the volatility of US government spending most of the time,
it is crucial to specify the “war dates” while identifying USgovernment spending shocks. To do so,
she defines a new variable called “military date” variable which takes the value of one at 1950:Q3
for Korean War, 1965:Q1 for Vietnam War, 1980:Q1 for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and
2001:Q3 for 9/11 terrorist attack and takes the value of zerootherwise. She adds that anticipated
and unanticipated fiscal shocks have different impacts on private consumption level and since wars
are anticipated several quarters before, households cut their consumption down and increase labor
hours and this is the reason behind an increase in output and adecrease in consumption during
wars.
Ramey (2011) also employs a VAR Model and adopts a Cholesky decomposition in which the
military date variable is ordered prior to all variables including non-defense government spending.
I estimate the same model by following this narrative approach for 1957:Q1-2013:Q1 and calculate
the impulse response functions. Since the sample starts at 1957, the military date variable excludes
1950:Q3 for Korean War and takes the value of one at 1965:Q1, 1980:Q1 and 2001:Q3. The vector
of endogenous variables is ordered as;Xt = [md,∆g,∆e,∆c,∆y,∆c∗,∆y∗]′ wheremd stands
for military date variable. Same as Ramey (2011), I analyze the effects of all variables due to a
positive shock to the military date variable.
Figure3.3shows the impulse response functions of the alternative VARmodel. The results of
the alternative model confirm the findings of the original model. Although there is a decrease in
US output at the first quarter as a result of a positive shock tothe military date variable, it becomes
positive at the second quarter and dies off at the end of the fift quarter. Even though US household
consumption responds with a delay, it is temporarily significant and positive at the third quarter
after the shock.
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Also similar to the results of the original SVAR model, the real xchange rate appreciates
and Canadian output increases. Despite the fact that Canadianconsumption goes up within two
quarters after the shock, it becomes negative at the sixth quarter.
3.4 Conclusion
The notion of international interdependence of economic policies asserts that domestic economy
does not only affect, but is also affected by foreign economies. Therefore it is important to under-
stand the dynamic effects of domestic policies on a global level. This study aims to address the
dynamic effects of US government spending shocks on the US and C adian economies.
I adopt the SVAR approach to examine the impulse response of US and Canadian macroeco-
nomic variables to US spending shocks. The SVAR analysis forperiod 1957:Q1-2013:Q1 shows
that a positive innovation to US government spending raisesUS GDP by USD1.73 within a quarter
after the shock. US household consumption also increases due to a positive spending shock as the
real exchange rate appreciates. Aside from these domestic impacts, an expansionary fiscal policy
also has positive effects on the Canadian economy. Canadian output increases significantly as a
result of a US fiscal expansion. The increase in Canadian output reaches 11% of the increase in
US output within a quarter after the shock. Given the size of the Canadian economy relative to the
US, this impact is quite large. This finding constitutes empirical evidence in favor of a positive
transmission of domestic fiscal shocks to trading partners.
Although theoretical literature on spillover effects of fiscal policy is plentiful, there are a small
number of studies in the empirical literature. This study helps to fill in this gap, contributing to
the empirical literature by examining the domestic and international effects of US government
spending shocks on her biggest trading partner, Canada for a long period of time by employing
Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002) identification restriction on a quarterly data and by stating evidence
in favor of a positive international transmission of an expansionary fiscal policy.
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Figure 3.1: Impulse Response Functions to a One Unit US Government Spending Shock
(a) Response of US Output (b) Response of US Consumption
(c) Response of Canadian Output (d) Response of Canadian Consumption
(e) Response of Real Exchange Rate
84
Table 3.1: Definition of Variables
Variable/Series Name Definition Data Source/Calculation
E Nominal Exchange Rate (CAD/USD) IMF-IFS
GOVTCONSEXP Nominal Government Consumption and Investment Expenditure-US BEA-Bureau of Economic Analysis
GDPDUS GDP Deflator-US IMF-IFS
GDPDC GDP Deflator-Canada IMF-IFS
CPIUS Consumer Price Index-US IMF-IFS
CPIC Consumer Price Index-Canada IMF-IFS
CONSUS Nominal Household Consumption-US IMF-IFS
CONSC Nominal Household Consumption-Canada IMF-IFS
GDPUS Nominal Gross Domestic Product-US IMF-IFS
GDPC Nominal Gross Domestic Product-Canada IMF-IFS
e Real Exchange Rate e=ExCPIUS/CPIC
g Real Government Consumption and Investment-US g=GOVTCONSEXPx100/GDPDUS
y Real GDP-US y=GDPUSx100/GDPDUS
y* Real GDP-Canada y*=GDPCx100 /GDPDC
c Real Household Consumption-US c=CONSUSx100/GDPDUS
c* Real Household Consumption-Canada c*=CONSCx100/GDPDC
∆e First Difference of Real Exchange Rate ∆e = et − et−1
∆g First Difference of Real Government Consumption and Investmn -US ∆g = gt − gt−1
∆y First Difference of Real GDP-US ∆y = yt − yt−1
∆y* First Difference of Real GDP-Canada ∆y∗ = y ∗t −y∗t−1
∆c First Difference of Real Household Consumption-US ∆c = ct − ct−1
∆c* First Difference of Real Household Consumption-Canada ∆c∗ = c ∗t −c∗t−1
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Figure 3.2: Impulse Response Functions to a One Unit US Government Spending Shock for period
1972-2013
(a) Response of US Output (b) Response of US Consumption
(c) Response of Canadian Output (d) Response of Canadian Consumption
(e) Response of Real Exchange Rate
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Figure 3.3: Impulse Response Functions to US Government Spending Shocks- Alternative VAR
Model
(a) Response of US Output (b) Response of US Consumption
(c) Response of Canadian Output (d) Response of Canadian Consumption
(e) Response of Real Exchange Rate
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Table 3.2: Unit Root Test Results for Variables
Variable ADF PP
w/intercept w/trend&intercept w/intercept w/trend&interc pt
y 1.43 -1.75 1.88 -1.72
y* 1.28 -1.91 1.45 -1.95
c 2.94 -1.32 3.18 -1.39
c* 3.44 -1.05 3.36 -1.07
e -1.74 -1.34 -1.91 -1.65
g 3.78 0.65 2.92 0.09
∆ y -6.44*** -9.49*** -9.34*** -9.65***
∆ y* -7.92*** -8.09*** -7.91*** -8.10***
∆ c -6.11*** -9.55*** -8.69*** -9.57***
∆ c* -13.02*** -13.76*** -13.04*** -13.74***
∆ e -12.51*** -12.55*** -12.46*** -12.50***
∆ g -12.15*** -12.78*** -12.87*** -13.10***
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Philips Perron (PP) unit root tests results are
shown. The null hypothesis states that the variable has unit root. *** denotes that
the null hypothesis is rejected at 1% significance level.
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Appendix: Fiscal Policy Coordination
Since a fiscal policy coordination between the US and Canada can cre te an omitted variable bias
for this study, hereby, I question if Canadian fiscal policy instrument should appear in the model as
well. I obtain the quarterly data for Canadian government consumption and expenditure for period
1957:Q1-2013:Q1 from IMF-IFS online database. Canada’s nomi al government consumption
and expenditure is deflated by Canada’s GDP deflator to get realgovernment consumption and
expenditure of Canada. It is called as Canadian government speding and defined in Canadian
dollars (CAD). To test if the response of Canadian output is biaed due to omission of Canadian
government spending, first, I compute the correlation coeffici nt between US government spending
and Canadian government spending to measure the strength of the correlation, if any. Given the
variance-covariance values for variables, the correlation c efficient is calculated as -0.03 which
indicates a tenuous negative correlation between US and Canadian fiscal policy instruments.
Second, to decide if Canadian government spending variable might appear in the model, I
perform Granger causality test. Table3.3represents the results of the test. The null hypothesis that
Canadian government spending does not Granger cause US government spending is not rejected at
10% significance level since 0.23>0.10. Also, for the second test, since 0.34>0.10, it is possible
to conclude that US government spending does not Granger cause Canadian government spending.
The test results does not support the claim of fiscal policy coordination between two countries.
Since there are limitations to Granger causality test, I include Canadian government spend-
ing variable∆g∗ in the model and then compute the impulse response functionsto check if the
responses of Canadian and US variables change.
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The model is defined as:
AXt =A
∗(L)Xt−1 + B
∗Zt + ǫt (3.4)
Aut =ǫt (3.5)
Zt =[seasonaldummies,D1990, D1991, D1988, D1994, D2008] (3.6)
whereXt = [∆g,∆g∗,∆y,∆c,∆e,∆y∗,∆c∗]′ is the vector of endogenous variables,L is the lag
operator,t is the vector of structural shocks andut is the vector of reduced form residuals.Zt is the
set of exogenous variables for time dummies; D1990 and D1991are 990 and 1991 Recession in
Canada, D1998 is for 1998 Free trade agreement between Canada and the US, D1994 and D2008
are for 1994 and 2008 Global economic crises, respectively.
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Figure3.4 shows the impulse responses of Canadian government spendingto a positive US
government spending shock. A positive shock to US government spending does not have a signif-
icant effect on Canadian government spending.
Furthermore, Figure3.5 shows the impulse responses of the rest of the endogenous variables
to a positive US government spending shock when Canadian government spending is included in
the model. The horizontal axis denotes time measured in quarters and vertical axes are stated in
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US dollars for US output and consumption, percentage pointsfor real exchange, Canadian dollars
for Canadian variables. A one dollar increase in US government spending increases US output by
USD1.34 within a quarter. The shock is transmitted positively to her neighbor. As a response to
a one dollar US government spending shock, Canadian output level increases by CAD0.17 within
a quarter. These responses are quite similar to the impulse response functions of the original
model which excludes Canadian government spending. Since the responses of Canadian and US
output and consumption levels are same and the response of Canadian government spending is
insignificant, it is possible to conclude that there is no fiscal policy coordination between Canada
and the US.
The correlation coefficient between US and Canadian government sp nding, the Granger causal-
ity test results and the impulse response functions of the alternative model do not support the claim
that there is an omitted variable bias in the original estimation.
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ing does not Granger cause US
government spending
210 1.21 0.23
US government spending does
not Granger cause Canadian
government spending
210 1.10 0.34
Figure 3.4: Response of Canadian Government Spending to US Government Spending Shock
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Figure 3.5: Impulse Response Functions to a One Unit US Government Spending Shock
(a) Response of US Output (b) Response of US Consumption
(c) Response of Canadian Output (d) Response of Canadian Consumption
(e) Response of Real Exchange Rate
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